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INTERSTATE ALLOCATION OF CORPORATE LNCOME FOR
TAXING PURPOSES
TAX Commissioner Long of Massachusetts was speaking before
the National Tax Association in 1925. "We who believe strongly
in income taxation as a fair measure for taxation purposes," he
said, "find much to comfort and much to disturb us in the deci-
sions of the courts ..... We find it, except in its application to
interstate commerce, working well but the decisions of the courts
leave us uncertain as to its success when applied to corporations
engaged in this type of business." 1 If it is judicial disapproval of
a tax measure which disturbs those who are interested in an effi-
cient system of income taxation, their re-action to the last word
of the United States Supreme Court on the subject will not be a
happy one.
The case is Hans Rees 'Sons v,. North Carolhz,- involving the
taxation of corporations whose activities spread across state
boundaries, the very matter which Conunissioner Long sees as the
ogre of a smooth-working income tax. North Carolina had pro-
vided for an annual governmental toll upon the net income of
every corporation, wherever chartered, doing business within
its borders.3 Fifteen other states had written similar taxes upon
their statute books.4 The proportion to be attributed to North
Carolina of the income of a company doing business elsewhere
was determined by a fraction whose numerator was the fair
value of the company's tangible property in North Carolina and
whose denominator was the fair value of all the company's tangi-
ble property.5 Other states similarly used an allocation fraction
to estimate the taxable portion of an interstate income.6 The
North Carolina taxing authorities, applying the statutory frac-
1 Long, Present Status of The Statc Income Tax as a Buvsnc~s Ta.
(1925) NATIONAL TAX ASSoCiATION PROCEEDINGS, 151, 158.
2 U. S. DAILY, April 16, 1931, at 386.
. C. Laws, 1923, ch. 4, sec. 201; 1925, ch. 101, see. 201; 1927, ch. 80,
sec. 311.
4 Ark., Cal., Conn., Ga., Mass., Miss., Mo., Mont., N. Y., N. D., Ore.,
S. C., Tenn., Va., Wis. The statutes are listed hi (1929) NATION ,L TAX
AssoCIATIoN PROCEEDINGS, at 163.
!This provision applied to manufacturing companies and such, dealing
in "tangible property," a different method of computation being used for
those dealing in "intangible property." See statutes cited, supra note 3.
CAll the states listed, supra note 4, use th allocation fraction except
Ga., Mont., and Ore.
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tion to the income of Hans Rees' Sons, a leather company whose
only factory was situated within the state, figured the taxable
portion of that income for the four years from 1923 to 1926 at
fractions averaging about eighty per cent.7 The leather company
protested against the size of the fractions and complained that
* the statute was unreasonable when so applieds The Supreme
Cou-t of North Carolina stood firm for the statute, the fractions,
and the taxing authorities." The company appealed to the United
States Supreme Court, claiming the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Twice before, that Court had upheld the use of
similar fractions under similar statutes, against similar pro-
tests., But.this time the Court was persuaded by the taxpayer's
plea. Speaking unanimously through Mr. Chief Justice Hughes,
it distinguished away the two earlier decisions and sent the tax
back to the North Carolina authorities for readjustment.
The argument of the company's counsel was as ingenious as
it was persuasive. Yet the earlier opinions on the subject had
saved counsel from the difficulty of working blindly. In Under-
wood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain," a Connecticut company
had complained against the taxing of 47% of its income, a pro-
portion calculated by the tangible property fraction. Conceding
that all its manufacturing was done in Connecticut, it had main-
tained that the bulk of its profits came from sales made in other
states. But the Supreme Court had ruled that such a showing
"wholly failed to sustain the objection" of unreasonableness,
inasmuch as the allocation fraction was a fair way of apportion-
ing to a taxing state its share of the linked chain of processes
that make up an interstate business. Again in Bass, Ratcliff and
Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission,1 where New York had
taxed an allocated portion of the income" of a British brewery
7 The computed fractions for the four years were: 1923, 83 per cent;
1924, 85 per cent; 1925, 66 per cent; 1926, 85 per cent.
s The taxes were figured at 4 per cent of the part of the annual income
allocated to North Carolina. The company admitted that the Commissioner
of Revenue had followed the statutory method and that the property valua-
tions and the computation of net income had been correct. Its only pro-
test was directed against the result of a proper application of the statute.
0 Maxwell v. Hans Rees' Sons, 199 N. C. 42, 153 S. E. 850, (1930). The
State Supreme Court sustained the trial court's ruling in striking out evi-
dence offered by the company (see infra, p. 1276) as immaterial; and
further held that even had the evidence been competent, it could not have
changed the decision.
10 Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113, 41 Sup Ct.
45 (1920); Bass, Ratcliff and Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, 266
U. S. 271, 45 Sup. Ct. 82 (1924) ; cf. National Leather Co. v. Massachusetts,
277 U. S. 413, 48 Sup. Ct. 534 (1928).
11 Supra note 10.
2Supra note 10.
1 The New York tax is labelled a "franchise tax" (N. Y. Laws, 1918,
chs. 271, 276, 417) but is computed exactly as are other state income taxes
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with a sales office in New York, the Court had stressed the "uni-
tary" nature of the business in upholding the tax against a cry of
unfairness. The implication of both opinions had been that the
fault of the cases against the taxes lay not in the pleadings but
in the proof; and that had counsel presented evidence to show
how manufacture and sales might clearly be separated for taxing
purposes, the charges of unfairness might have been heeded.1
The attorneys for Hans Rees' Sons, furthermore, had direct
precedent to guide them. In Stamidard Oil Co. v. Thorscn," an
allocation fraction had been used to measure the taxable income
of a corporation whose only activity in North Dakota was the
sale of oil products manufactured and refined outside the state.
The company had offered in protest an alternative computation,
based entirely on its own accounting, whereby the sales end of
the business was tkeated as a separate unit and a part of the
company's income allotted to North Dakota corresponding to the
proportion of its total sales made in that state. The Circuit
Court of Appeals of the 8th Circuit had accepted the company's
figure, and nullified the use of the statutory fraction as an at-
tempt to tax property outside the state.le The Thorenson case
had then been followed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Standard Oil Co. v. Wisconsin Tao- Commissiaon. Here the com-
pany had prepared an even more divergent method of computa-
tion as a substitute for the statutory fraction. Treating its
Wisconsin sales office as an autonomous retailer it had figured
Wisconsin income by subtracting from gross Wisconsin sales the
overhead of the office plus the cost to the office of products
and is universally regarded as an income tax. See Gerstenberg, Rcpart of
Committee on Standardization and Simplificatioa of the Busir ss Ta.cs,;
(1929) NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION PROCEEmNGs, 152.
-
4
"The plaintiff's argument ... carries the burden of showing that 47
per cent of its net income is not attributable, for purposes of taxation,
to the manufacture of products from the sale of which 80 per cent of its
gross earnings was derived.... The corporation has not even attempted
to show this; . . . ." Underwood Typewriter Co. v. Chamberlain, supra
note 10, at 121, 41 Sup. Ct. at 47. This passage is quoted in Bass, Rat-
cliff and Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commission, supra note 10, at 281,
45 Sup. Ct. at 84.
15 29 F. (2d) 708 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
16 Judge Pollock, in the Thorensen case, seemed to rely largely on dicta
of Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Sanford v. Poe, 165 U. S. 194, 17 Sup. Ct.
305 (1897), a case dealing with the application of the "unit rule" of
property taxation (see infra p. 1279) to express companies. The only case
cited as more or less direct precedent for the decision was Firher v.
Standard Oil Co., 12 F (2d) 774 (C. C. A. Sth, 1926), a case which over-
threw a commission-set tax because the statutory fraction had not been
properly applied, and which distinctly advocated the method of computa-
tion -which the commissioner used and the court reversed in the Thorensen
case.
17197 Wis. 630, 223 N. W. 85 (1929).
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"bought" from the company itself. The court, in accepting this
figure and throwing out the commission assessment, had returned
to the company almost seventy thousand dollars.'8
So in the Rees case, counsel found their lead well-defined.
To support their claim that the eighty per cent fraction was
too high, they produced evidence to the effect that the company's
total income accumulated from three separate sources. Buying
profit, it was said, resulted from peculiar skill in dealing in the
market for leather hides. Selling profit came from cutting
finished leather in accordance with consumers' demands. Both
these processes took place in New York. Manufacturing profit
alone, described as the difference between the contract cost and
the actual cost of tanning, could be assigned to North Carolina.
And for the four assessment years the proportion of total income
to be ascribed to manufacturing profit averaged, only seventeen
per cent. 19
In agreeing with the company that the tax had been set too
high, the Supreme Court was doubtless impressed by the tre-
mendous difference between the commission's eighty per cent and
the company's seventeen per cent. It was sufficiently impressed
to declare that the company's analysis of its own business
amounted to more than a "negligible criticism" of the practical
impossibility of mathematical exactness in tax apportionment,
and that it sufficed to break down the unitary conception of a
single business on which the statutory estimate was based. Th-
Underwood and Bass cases, said the Court, stood only for the
principle that the unit idea and the dependent allocation fraction
were valid on their face until contradicted by proof that a busi-
ness might be split into segments for taxation purposes. But
the Court seemed to forget having said in the Bass case that
even if the taxpayer had received no net income in the taxing
state, as the Bass Co. there alleged, still the theoretical income
assigned it by the fraction might properly be taxed.20 Certainly
no scheme of splitting up the business, however elaborate, could
have strengthened the argument that no income from any source
was received in the state which was attempting to tax income
there received.
18 Judge Rosenberry, writing the opinion, relied largely on the Thorensen
decision, concerning the basis of which, see note 16, supra.
19 All this evidence had been rejected by the trial court as immaterial.
See note 9, supra.
20 "Furthermore, the statutory method of apportionment not being shown
to be arbitrary or unreasonable, we think that the Court of Appeals
rightly held that the tax imposed for the carrying on of the business in
New York is not invalid merely because in the preceding year the business
conducted in New York may have yielded no net income." Bass, Rateliff
and Gretton, Ltd. v. State Tax Commissions, supra note 10, at 284, 46
Sup. Ct. at 85.
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It is of more importance that the Court in the Rees case, con-
sidering the question before it with traditional judicial blinders,
seemed to overlook the probable effect of the decision on the
parties involved once the case itself was disposed of. For
the substance of the leather company's argument was that the
bulk of its income was assignable to New York activities and
should be taxed by New York rather than by North Carolina.
Yet New York, in estimating the taxable portion of an inter-
state income, uses a fraction very similar to that used in North
Carolina.21 According to such a fraction, New York would
find itself taxing considerably less than the eighty-three percent
which the company would have assigned it by reason of the
"buying profit" and "selling profit" factors argued before the
Supreme Court to escape the North Carolina tax.2 And
it can scarcely be supposed that the company would quarrel
with the minuteness of the New York tax. Hence the
Rees case allows an interstate income taxpayer to choose from
two methods of computation the one wlich will subject him to
the lesser assessment in each state, and thus to reduce materially
below his total income the sum on which that income will be
state taxed."3
Considered from the general angle of effective tax administra-
tion which prompted the comments of Commissioner Long, the
result of the Rees case is even more bewildering. Almost all the
states which had settled on corporate incomes as a source of
revenue had resorted to the allocation fraction as the best means
of splitting up an interstate income.2 The method had been ap-
proved and sponsored by the National Tax Association.5 In
2' New York in its allocation fraction includes bills and accounts receiv-
able, and shares of stock held in other companies, along with the tangible
property factor used by North Carolina. That the inclusion of numerous
items will have little effect on the resultant fraction, in that one item may
be fractionally representative of several, see Gerstenberg, .,pra note 13,
at 158.
22By assigning to other states where sales were made part of New York's
"buying profit" and "selling profit," the company could attempt to redue,
its New York fraction below eighty-three per cent. But no such suggez-
tion was made in the Rees case, where the company's sole desire was to
wrest as much of its income as possible from North Carolina.
- It is interesting to note that the committee of the National Tax Asso-
ciation which studied this problem warned against the converse of this
possibility,-i. e., taxation of more than a company's total income--which
might also result from lack of uniformity in the state fractions. Gersten-
berg, supra note 13, at 155.
24 See note 16, supra. There is some variance in the items used by the
different states in their fractions, but that this is likely to cause only a
slight difference in the resultant computation, see note 21, supra.
-See (1928) NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION PRoCCEDINS, 429. The ideal
allocation fraction there advocated is made up of two factors: tangible
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general, it had the advantage of comparative simplicity. Inas-
much as the factors used by the various states in their fractions
were or could easily be made identical, it offered the possibility
of uniformity. The Underwood and Bass cases had seemed to
endow it with constitutionality. In short, the allocation fraction
seemed a thoroughly practical method of dealing with a difficult.
problem in taxation. Now comes the Supreme Court and says
that any taxpayer who finds the difference in taxes worth the
expense of the contest may force the taxing authorities to accede
to a self-devised scheme of computation, no matter how compli-
cated and incapable of uniform application it may be.
For a tax commission is ill-equipped to inspect and supervise
every elaborate accountfng scheme which may be proffered by
corporation counsel as a fairer substitute for the allocation frac-
tion.2 6 Such supervision would mean, in effect, a unique compu-
tation of each assessment after a thorough investigation of the
activities and finances of the corporation. It would entail a
tremendous expense of time and energy. The cost of investiga-
tion might well consume a large part of the tax funds collected
and thus defeat its own end.27 The same administrative and
technical difficulties would be encountered which have plagued
utility rate regulation since the devices of the utilities have forced
the commissions to act as financial policemen in order to make
regulation effective. But in the absence of some such super-
vision, the corporations would be practically setting their own
taxes, a practice of doubtful value as a revenue-producing scheme.
Should interstate corporations, then, take too eager advantage
of the Rees decision, the tax experts would be forced to abandon
the allocation fraction method of taxing corporate income.
Nor is it the first time that the Supreme Court has allowed
property and "business," the latter to be computed by a combination of
sales, purchases, and wages paid. This fraction has been adopted by
North Dakota and was the one involved in the Thorensen case, supra note
15.
26 See the excellent opinion of the Wisconsin Tax Commission, quoted
in a footnote of Standard Oil Co. v. Wisconsin Tax Commission, supra note
17, which concludes: "Even though its (the appellant's) business activities
in this state were ever so separate and distinct from its other business
activities in other states, a faulty method of accounting for the income
arising from those business activities within Wisconsin cannot be accepted
simply because the business activities themselves might be capable of
separation."
27 Cf. Mr. Justice Pitney, dissenting in Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright,
infra note 28, at 290, 39 Sup. Ct. at 281: "For if the state authorities were
required to keep a check either upon the average' use or the aggregate
mileage covered by the movements of rolling stock within the State, and
to supplement this with observations in other States in order to arrivo
at the due proportion, the cost of administration easily might consume tho
tax."
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the intricate arguments of taxpayers to obstruct the smooth
working of an established taxing scheme on which it had pre-
viously bestowed its general approval. The closest analogy to the
allocation fraction scheme of apportioning taxes had been the
so-called "unit rule," by which the states taxed property used
in interstate business.28 According to this rule, the entire prop-
erty of a railroad, telegraph company or such was treated as a
unit and divided between the states for taxation purposes accord-
ing to a theoretically representative fraction, such as the rail-
road trackage within the state over the total trackage of the
road. The unit rule was upheld by the Supreme Court in a long
line of cases, until it seemed firmly and irreversibly established.2
Then in Union Tank Line v. Wright,- protest was made against
calculation by the trackage fraction of a Georgia property tax on
tank cars used in and out of the state. The taxpayer produced
statistics to show that the average numbers of its cars in the
state per day was considerably lower than the theoretical aver-
age computed by the tax fraction. The Supreme Court, won over
by the numerical disparity, reversed the tax in spite of a strong
dissent, joined in by three of the justices, which spoke of the
evils of leaving tax ascertainment "wholly within the breast of
the taxpayer." 31
Yet another analogy is to be found in the very field of corporate
income taxation, where the development of the system had struck
a Supreme Court snag before the Rees case. At first, the com-
plaint that the taxing of interstate incomes amounted to an
unconstitutional burdening of interstate commerce had failed to
move the Court. It had held in several cases that a state might
properly tax the income of a corporation doing business there,
even though part of that income resulted from interstate
activities,32 provided only that the tax be laid on the net income
2s For a full description of the unit rule and its history in the United
States Supreme Court to that date, see the majority and dissenting opinions
in Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U. S. 275, 39 Sup. Ct. 276 (1919).
See also Isaacs, The U it Rule (1926) 35 YALE L. J. 838.
29 Among the leading cases are Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S.
321, 6 Sup. Ct. 57 (1885) (railroads); Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Massachusetts, 125 U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. 961 (1888) (telegraph companies) ;
Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 11 Sup. Ct 876
(1891) (sleeping car companies); Adams Express Co. v. Ohio, 165 U. S.
194, 17 Sup. Ct. 305 (1897) (express companies); American Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Hall, 174 U. S. 70, 19 Sup. Ct. 599 (1899) (refrigerator car
companies).
so Supra, note 28.
n See note 27, supra. Cf. Wallace v. Hines, 253 U. S. 66, 40 Sup. Ct.
435 (1919) (unit rule held inapplicable in North Dakota because trachs
and stations there represent lower proportional capital outlay than in
other states).
32 U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321, 38 Sup. CL 499 (1918);
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and not the gross. 3 3 Then came the Alpam Portland Cement 4
case. A New Jersey corporation with its main office in Penn-
sylvania and a central New England sales office in Massachu-
setts complained that Massachusetts' attempt to tax part of its
net income was unconstitutional. The earlier cases were dis-
tinguished on the ground that there at least part of the taxed
incomes had been intrastate, whereas here no part of the income
could be so labelled inasmuch as all orders received at the
Massachusetts office were relayed to the Pennsylvania office for
confirmation. And the Supreme Court accordingly held that
although an interstate income might be taxed when coupled with
an intrastate income, nevertheless Massachusetts' attempt to
tax a part of the cement company's net profits amounted to an
unconstitutional burdening of interstate commerce.,
In the Rees case, as in the Union Tank Line and Alpha. Port-
land Cement cases, it was the skillful argument of a recalcitrant
taxpayer that induced the Supreme Court to sidetrack the de-
velopment of a taxing scheme, at least to the extent of rendering
it inoperative in the particular instance. But another method of
partially evading the burden of a corporate income tax had
previously been devised. The fact that only a smattering of
states impose such taxes had encouraged several companies
whose activities were split among taxing and non-taxing states
to set up separate manufacturing and sales corporations, finan-
cially interdependent but legally autonomous, and so deprive a
taxing state of the power to levy upon the profits thus isolated
to one of the processes of a single business." Reduction of
taxable income by such use of holding and subsidiary corpora-
Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 40 Sup. Ct. 221 (1920); Hunip IIairpin
Manufacturifig Co. v. Emmerson, 258 U. S. 290, 42 Sup. Ct. 305 (1922);
Atlantic Coast Line v. Daughton, 262 U. S. 413, 43 Sup. Ct. 620 (1923).
33 Galveston, Harrisburg and San Antonio Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217,
28 Sup. Ct. 638 (1908); Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U. S. 292,
38 Sup. Ct. 126 (1917). In U. S. Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, svpra noto 32,
Mr. Justice Pitney differentiates between a tax on gross income as a direct
burden on interstate income, and a tax on net income as an itdirect and
hence permissible burden.
- Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U. S. 203, 45 Sup.
Ct. 477 (1925).
35 For criticisms of the decision from the angles of tax administration
and of constitutional law, see Long, supra note 1, and Powell, Business
Taxes and the Federal Constitution (1925) NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION
PROCEEDINGS, 164; and note the comments of the Association on those two
papers, in the same volume at 196 et seq.
3 For a thorough discussion of this practice and its possibilities, see
Magill, Allocation of Income by Corporate Contract (1931) 44 HAR. L.
REv. 935. Cf. Breckenridge, Tax Escape by Manipulations of Holding Com-
pany (1931) 9 N. C. L. REV. 189; (1931) 31 COL. L. Rav. 719.
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tions had withstood judicial inspection.37 But a federal district
court recently warned against too obvious tax evasion by this
method when it allowed the Wisconsin commission to treat an
affiliated group of corporations as a taxable unit where it ap-
peared that the "contract" between the Wisconsin manufacturing
company and its Delaware sales company operated to reduce
the income of the former to a negligible fraction of the ultimate
profits.-8 Thus the tax-reduction advantages of the separate
corporation set-up are boiled down to a realistic division of in-
come between the various processes of a manifold business. Yet
the Rees case offers exactly the same opportunity without the
further necessity of splitting the business into separate legal
entities. A single corporation need only show that its manu-
facturing profits and its sales profits can be distinguished to force
their distinction for taxing purposes. I foreover, as previously
indicated, a single corporation can neglect to point out the dis-
tinction wherever the allocation fraction applied to the business
as a unit is kinder to the taxpayer's treasury.
The popular notion of the tax-collector as a public enemy has
been forced upon many lawyers because they are in the direct
or indirect employ of heavily taxed corporations. To them the
"practical" approach to the problem is always--How best can
the tax be reduced or avoided. Legal commentators assume a
similar attitude 31 or content themselves with the abstractions
of legal theory, or perhaps avoid the latter tack by adopting an
impartial and "functional" stand for fairness in taxation, un-
hindered by inclusive schemes or theories.1 To any or all of
these the Rees decision may appeal as just and proper. But to
those who, like Commissioner Long, are interested from the
governmental angle in a working system of taxation, the Rees
decision can only appear as an added obstacle.
The problem outlined by the case is a miniature replica of the
larger problem of state taxation. The most likely sources of
revenue are the large industrial corporations which have sup-
37 People ex. rel. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist, 24- N. Y. 114, 155 N. E.
68 (1926).
38 Palmolive Co. v. Conway, 43 F. (2d) 226 (W. D. Wis., 1930). To the
same effect, see Buick Motor Co. v. Milwaukee, 43 F. (2d) 385 (R. D.
Wis., 1930) (commission allowed to disregard separate corporation set-up
where actual income shown to exceed "contract" income).
3q Cf. articles cited, supra note 36.
40 Cf. Rottschaefer, State Jurisdiction of Incomw for Tax Purposes (1931)
44 HARV. L. REV. 1075.
-Cf. Powell, supra note 35. Mr. Powell deplores the Alpha Portland
Cement decision, supra note 34, .as unwarranted and based on unsound
logical deduction; but also deplores the Bazs decision, supra note 10, as
unfair to the taxpayer.
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planted the landowners as the rich men of the time. But
corporations today are no respecters of state boundaries. Their
property and their activities are scattered throughout the states
wherever population or natural resources may demand. Yet
state boundaries are a part of our federal system and are written
into our Constitution. And the federal government must also
live on revenue garnered through a power of regulation which
presupposes a group of separate states. Between this govern-
mental inheritance and the contradictory nature of modern in-
dustry and commodity-distribution, the states must steer a
difficult course. Schemes of taxation must be devised which will
effectively reach the corporate wealth and yet will not offend
the legal system which grants the taxing power.
To this dilemma the Rees case offers at best a haphazard solu-
tion. State taxation schemes are to be tested by a slow system of
trial-and-error. First the legislature must work out and enact
a tax law. It must be sufficiently detailed, sufficiently definite in
its laying down of tax schedules, to escape the added constitu-
tional hazard of "delegated legislation." 42 The tax commissioners
must rigidly adhere to the schedule so laid down. They may
apply the law and collect taxes for years, may even be upheld at
times by the courts, before effective protest is made by a wounded
taxpayer. Such protest will almost always take the form of a
showing that a particular tax measure, though proper in itself,
is unreasonable in its exceptional application to the complainant.
But once the courts uphold such a protest, the door is opened
for countless protests phrased in similar language. Taxes are
sent back to the commission which then has no choice but to bow
to the plea for reduction. The measure loses its omnipotence, and
with it its effectiveness. And the legislature must start all over
with a new revenue measure.
The delay and uncertainty of such a process, contrasted with
the ever-immediate need of state revenue, demand for the situa-
tion a more workable solution. Voluntary agreements between
the states, supported by the legal doctrine of comity, have been
urged as a salutory step.43 In this manner, uniformity would
be guaranteed and the problem created by state borders would
42In Commonwealth v. P. Lorillard Co., 129 Va. 74 (1921), the tax
assessors, working under a statute which laid a tax upon corporate income,
devised an allocation scheme to measure the Virginia income of a foreign
corporation doing business in the state. The statute itself provided no
method of apportionment. The court, altho implying that the scheme
would have been valid had it been written in the state, reverced the tax
on the ground that the commission had exceeded its proper powers.




be insured a less piece-meal consideration. But while courts
continue to tolerate the clever excuses of complaining taxpayers,
even interstate agreements would run the same risk of belated
judicial disapproval.4 The only possible escape from this risk
seems to lie in a scheme whereby the federal government would
allot to each state its share of taxes levied on interstate enter-
prise. Whatever constitutional difficulties 45 would be encount-
ered could doubtless be more easily and more quickly resolved
than those inherent in the present hit-or-miss system. A problem
nation-wide by nature would receive federal attention from the
start instead of being relegated to splotchy federal supervision
after tentative solutions are well under way. Finally, it might
force judicial recognition of the administrative difficulties that
beset any attempt to levy state taxes fairly and yet effectively.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION I DEPORTATION CASES
THE drive announced by the Secretary of Labor to rid the country
of "illegal invaders," as an aid to unemployment relief,1 sharpens
the significance of recent decisions of the federal courts in de-
portation cases. Even when directed with the most scrupulous
intention to keep within statutory powers, it cannot be doubted
that administrative zeal to produce large-scale results 2 is prone
to breed, especially among the subordinate officials who handle
most of the detail of the individual cases, administrative laxity
- Unless all the states were to pass corporate income taxes and all to
join in the interstate agreements, the same protests supported by the
same evidence, might be voiced against multi-state income apportionment
as were made in the Rees case against the scheme of a single state.
45 The greatest of these would probably lie in the attempt to work out
the sphere of federal jurisdiction. Thus, although a strictly intrastate
business would be constitutionally immune to federal regulation, the prob-
lem would remain of determining what, if any, businesses at no time
reach across state boundaries.
1 See New York Herald-Tribune, April 11, 1931, at 1.





ANNUAL REPORT OF THE C01ImIIssIoNER GENER,4L OF IMMIGlUTON (1930)
at 7. A record of 20,000 deportations has been predicted for the fiscal
year ending June 30, 1931. For a recent report of the progress of the
Labor Department's deportation program, and criticism of some features
thereof, see New York Herald Tribune, April 11, 1931, at 1; April 17 at 16.
1931] 1283
1284 YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
in the methods by which results are accomplished. And no fresh
demonstration should be required to show that the danger of
abuse of power is heightened at a time when popular apprehen-
sion is stirred by reports which, rightly br wrongly, tenid-to
identify a general class, against certain members of which the
power may be properly directed, with more or less imminent
menace to public security.3
It is well settled that deportation proceedings are not in the
technical sense penal in character.4  They may therefore be
entrusted to administrative officers for determination and are
not required to follow the forms of judicial procedure.' Never-
theless, the nature of their consequences to the individual is such
as to bring them clearly within the requirement of the Fifth
Amendment as to due process of law.6 Deportation proceedings
begin with a deprivation of liberty, and it has not escaped judi-
3 See POST, DEPORTATIONS DELIRIU%x OF 1920 (1923); Reports made to
Senate Judiciary Committee on activities of the Department of Justice in
connection with the "red" raids of 1920, 64 CONG. Rc. 3051-73 (1923);
REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE CoImumUNIsT ACTIVITIES AND
PROPAGANDA, U. S. DAILY, Jan. 19, 1931, Supplement.
4 Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., 149 U. S. 698, 13 Sup. Ct. 1016 (1892) ; Zakon-
aite v. Wolf, 226 U. S. 272, 33 Sup. Ct. 31 (1912).
5 Ekiu v. U. S., 142 U. S. 651, 12 Sup. Ct. 336 (1891) ; Fong Yuo Ting v.
U. S., supra note 4. But a question of jurisdiction is presented when the
person against whom the proceedings are directed alleges himself to be
a citizen. The decision of the Secretary of Labor, under the Chinese Ex-
clusion Act, has been held to be final even in such a case. U. S. v. Ju
Toy, 198 U. S. 253, 25 Sup. Ct. 644 (1905). The Ju Toy case represents
an extreme of judicial non-interference with the finding of the administra-
tive officer, especially in view of the fact that in that case the District
Court had found the petitioner to be a citizen. A distinction is now estab-
lished between a person seeking entry, in legal contemplation a person
still outside the borders of the United States, and a resident who has been
lawfully admitted and supports 'his allegation of citizenship with sub-
stantial evidence. In the latter case the jurisdiction of the Secretary may
be tested judicially. Ng Fung He v. White, 259 U. S. 276, 42 Sup. Ct.
492 (1921); and the burden of proof of alienage is on the government.
Bilokumsky v. Ted, 263 U. S. 149, 44 Sup. Ct. 54 (1923).
6 Aliens as well as citizens have Constitutional rights. Yiek We v,
Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064 (1886). As to persons seeking
admission Congress has authority to entrust the final determination of
questions of fact to an executive officer, his order then representing due
process of law. Ekiu v. U. S., supra note 5. Administrative officers, how-
ever, may not disregard the fundamental principles of due process of
law which include the right to be heard. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U. S. 86,
23 Sup. Ct. 611 (1903). 'And the hearing must be fair. Chin Yew v. U.
S., 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201 (190&) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S.
454, 40 Sup. Ct. 566 (1920). Only where the deportation proceedings are
fairly conducted and the findings supported by substantial evidence is
the finding of the administrative officer conclusive. Whitfield v, Hanges,
222 Fed. 745 (C. C. A. 8th, 1915); Lisotta v. U. S., 3 F. (2d) 108 (C.
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cial notice that they may entail deprivation of property and even
of life itself.7 When the Supreme Court by its decisions in Fong
Yue Ting v. United Statess and United Statcs v. Ju Toy" af-
firmed a doctrine of non-interference with administrative discre-
tion in deportation cases, a recognition of the severity of de-
portation in terms of human fortunes and happiness impelled the
forceful dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Brewer and others of
his colleagues. In certain recent opinions in the Circuit Courts
of Appeals there is a revival of emphasis on this consideration
as a reason for requiring a more exacting construction of the due
process rights of an alien and a more restricted construction of
the statutory grounds upon which deportation orders may be
based. As a result there has developed on certain points a con-
flict of authority likely to require solution by the Supreme Court
which, although it has not maintained the pristine rigor of its
doctrine of non-interference, has been sparing in its pronounce-
ments in deportation matters."'
C. A. 5th, 1924); Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 Fed. 17 (D. Mass. 1920). See
BouvP, EXCLUSION AND EXPULSION OF ALIENS IN TIE UNITED STATES
(1912). Chap. IV; DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUsTICE (1927), 290-296.
In England the alien enjoys no similar legal safeguards. Thus when the
Home Secretary, acting under statutory authority, orders the deportation
of an alien as "conducive to the public good," he acts as an executive offi-
cer and not as a judicial tribunal and is not bound to grant a hearing.
Ex parte Venicoff, 3 K. B. 72 (1920). But cf. Ex parte O'Brien, 2 K. B.
361 (1923) (rights of citizen affected by deportation order). In countries
where executive discretion is absolute and final, the rights of aliens against
unjustified acts of expulsion are nevertheless not without protection under
international law, though their assertion in a given case is dependent on
the bringing of a claim by the state of which the alien is a national. See
note 44, infra,
7 "It deprives of liberty. It may result also in loss of both property and
life; or of all that makes life worth living." Ng Fung Ho v. White, supra
note 5, at 284, 42 Sup. Ct. at 495. A forceful presentation of the conse-
quences of deportation and of the views of Madison and other early Ameri-
can statesmen is contained in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brewer
in Fong Yue Ting v. U. S., supra note 4, at 740, 13 Sup. Ct. at 1029. The
heaviest consequences of deportation often fall not upon the individual
deported but upon families left in this country. There are, however, no
constitutional guarantees relating to the rights of the family as such. For
some of the social effects of deportation see ABBOTT, IMMIGRATIOi, SELECT
DOCUMENTS AND CASE RECORDS (1924) 298-460; SOCIAL CONSIDERATIONS IN
DEPORTATION, FOREIGN LANGUAGE INFORMATION SERVICE, T INTERPRETER RE-
LEASE 121 (1930).
8 Supra note 4. Brewer, J., Field, J., and Fuller, C. J., dissented.
9Supra note 5. Brewer, J., with whom concurred Peckham, J., wrote a
dissenting opinion and Day, J., dissented without opinion.
10 Outside of cases otherwise cited in foot-notes, the following list is be-
lieved to comprise the Supreme Court opinions of general importance on
deportation questions during the last twenty years: Low Wah Sucy v.
Backus, 225 U. S. 460, 32 Sup. Ct. 734 (1912); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228
U. S. 585, 33 Sup. Ct. 607 (1913); U. S. v. Woo Jan, 245 U. S. 552, 38 Sup.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
I. EFFECT OF CRIMES COMMITTED IN THE UNITED STATES
In the case of Browne v. Zurbrick '1 the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in the Sixth Circuit recently dealt with one of the vexed
problems created by cases of re-entry. It proceeded on the express
hypothesis that, unless the application of the statute to the case
is clear, because of the gravity of the effects of deportation the
order to deport cannot be allowed to stand.12 In this case, the alien
had resided lawfully in the United States for eight years when he
committed a crime; he was convicted but placed on probation and
continued in his regular employment. Although the statute 11
provides for the deportation of aliens sentenced to imprisonment
"because of conviction in this country of a crime involving moral
turpitude," 14 he was at the time safe from deportation because,
to bring it under this section of the statute, the crime must have
been committed within five years after entry. A year later,
however, with the consent of his probation officer, he made a
ten-days' visit to relatives in Canada. Following his return he
was taken into custody by immigration officials and ordered de-
ported on the ground that he had been convicted of a felony
prior to entry. On petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the
Court of Appeals directed his release.
It has been established by Supreme Court decisions, in de-
ference to what was deemed the manifest intention of Congress
in changes introduced in the Immigration Act of 1903, that any
re-entry renders an alien subject to the strictures of the Act,
Ct. 207 (1918); Tisi v. Tad, 264 U. S. 131, 44 Sup. Ct. 260 (1924); Whita
v. Chin Fong, 253 U. S. 90, 70 Sup. Ct. 449 (1919); Mahler v. Eby, 264
U. S. 32, 44 Sup. Ct. 283 (1923) ; Quon Quoi Poy v. Johnson, 273 U. S.
352, 47 Sup. Ct. 346 (1927); Claussen v. Day, 279 U. S. 398, 49 Sup. Ct.
354 (1929); Wenglinsky v. Zurbrick, 51 Sup. Ct. 35 (U. S. 1930), reversing
without opinion 38 F. (2d) 985 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
1145 F. (2d) 931 (C. C. A. 6th, 1930).
1 A recent statutory change is made the point of departure in adopting
this view, the court stating: "Whether, in view of this change in the re-
sults of a deportation order, the courts will construe mare liberally the due
process rights of an alien, is a question that will eventually call for con-
sideration; here it is enough to say that, in applying the supposed statutory
grounds of deportation to this alien, long rightfully domiciled here, the
application must be clear, and cannot rest on doubtful interpretation."
Ibid, at 932.
13 39 STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U. S. C. A. § 155 (1926).
14 Congress has made it a condition that the crime must be shamefully
immoral, leaving no test other than accepted moral standards to be ap-
plied by the courts; under such a test not every violation of the National
Prohibition Act can be regarded as. involving moral turpitude. Se lorlo
v. Day, 34 F.' (2d) 920, 921 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929). The allocation may de-
pend upon the facts in the particular case. Browne v. Zurbrick, supra,
note 11, at 933 (refraining from decision upon the character of the offense
involved in this case which was the taking of indecent liberties with a
girl of fifteen). See 28 CoL. L. Ry. 1100 (1928).
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regardless of previously acquired domicile in this country,1
And the admission, or conviction, of the commission of a crime
prior to entry is ground for deportation.", The issue in Brownc
v. Zurbrick was the application of this provision to an alien who
had committed a crime in this coaentry. Looking narrowly at the
one provision of the statute and at the authority of the Supreme
Court decisions as to "entry", the conclusion might be readily
drawn, as it was in Bendel v. Nagle 1T in 1927, that such an
-alien falls within the description. Only by considering the stat-
ute more comprehensively is an implication discoverable that the
offense committed prior to an entry which will bar admission is
limited to one committed outside the territory of the United
States. The basis for this interpretation is that deportation as
a consequence of a crime committed in this country is especially
provided for and made subject to certain qualifications. Not
only must the crime have been committed within five years after
entry and been followed by conviction and sentence for one year
or more, but even then deportation will not follow if the alien
has been pardoned or if the judge in rendering sentence has
recommended to the Secretary of Labor that the alien shall not
be deported as a consequence. ' In view of these specifications,
necessarily limited to crimes committed in the United States,
it is possible to conclude that Congress intended a distinction
based upon the place of crime, a distinction not altered by re-
entry. This construction the Court in the SLxth Circuit adopts,
and, in doing so, it carries to its logical conclusion a process of
differentiation already worked out in the Ninth Circuit.Y,
25 The provisions of the Act of 1891 (26 STAT. 1084) and of the acts
which preceded it had been construed as applying only to "alien immi-
grants" and as not including aliens previously resident in this country. In
re Panzara, 51 Fed. 275 (E. D. N. Y. 1892) ; In re Martorelli, 63 Fed. 437
(S. D. N. Y. 1894) ; In re Maiola, 67 Fed. 114 (S. D. N. Y. 1895) ; In re Ota,
96 Fed. 487 (N. D. Cal. 1899). But the Supreme Court "upon a review of the
whole matter," pronounced itself "satisfied that Congrcss in the Act of 190.1,
sufficiently expressed, and in the act of 1907 reiterated, the purpose of apply-
ing its prohibition against the admission of aliens, and its mandate for their
deportation to all aliens whose history, condition or characteristics brought
them within the descriptive clauses, irrespective of any qualification arising
out of a previous residence or domicile in this country." Lapina v. Williams,
232 U. S. 78, 91, 34 Sup. Ct. 196, 200 (1914). Accord: Lewis v. Friel:, 233
U. S. 291, 34 Sup. Ct. 488 (1914).
16 39 STAT. 889 (1917), 8 U. S. C. A. § 155 (1926). By the same section
any alien who at the time of entry was one of the excluded classes is
subject to deportation. Persons who have been convicted of, or admit the
commission of a crime, are excluded. 39 STAT. 875 (1917), 8 U. S. C. A. §
136 (1926).
1 17 F. (2d) 719 (C. C. A. 9th, 1927).
1s39 STAT. 839 (1917), 8 U. S. C. A. § 155 (1926).
19 When this question arose in the Ninth Circuit in 1925, the question of
the place where the crime was committed was not considered. Weedin v.
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II. CONSTRUCTION OF "LIKELY TO BECOME A PUBLIC CHARGE"
Aliens "likely to become a public charge" at the time of arrival
are barred by the statute and even though they may gain ad-
mission are subject to deportation at any time within a five-
year period after entry.0 The limitations placed by judicial
construction on the application of these provisions are few and
not sharply defined. In Gegiow v. Uhi211 the Supreme Court held
that the immigration authorities exceeded their jurisdiction un-
der the statute in detaining immigrants for deportation merely
because an over-supply of labor existed at the point of destina-
tion. The grounds of exclusion enumerated in the section of
the statute in which the "public charge" phrase then occurred 22
were construed to be "permanent personal objections irrespective
of local conditions." Two years later in the Immigration Act of
1917 23 the phrase was shifted so as to dissociate it from the
Yamada, 4 F. (2d) 455 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). That case concerned a Jap-
anese, twenty-two years in the United States, married, and with children
born in this country, who, eleven years after a re-entry from a visit to
Japan, was ordered deported for a crime committed in the United States
seventeen years before the deportation proceedings were instituted. In
Bendel v. Nagle, supra, note 17, the alien was a Canadian who had re-
sided in the United States nineteen years but had re-visited Canada. The
fact that the crime on which the deportation order was founded had been
committed in the United States was held not material since it was a crime
prior to the last entry. But in Shibata v. Carr, 35 F. (2d) 636 (C. C. A.
9th, 1929) which concerned an alien who had made false statements at
the time of his entry and who eight years later, after his wife had joined
him and two children had been born in this country, was ordered deported
for the commission of perjury "prior to entry," the court held that since
the crime was committed, if at all, in the United States, the alien was
subject to deportation only for conviction and not for admission merely.
In Wong Yew v. Weedin, 33 F. (2d) 377 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929) an alien,
established in the United States for twenty-six years and having the status
of a Chinese treaty merchant, had contracted a bigamous marriage in this
country. Upon a re-entry he was ordered deported for admitting the crime
of bigamy "prior to entry." The court, in ordering his release, based its
decision not on the distinction between conviction and admission but on
the ground that Congress intended a classification of crime with reference
to the place of commission. "We are inclined to think Congress, probably
having in mind 6nly a single entry, used the phrase [prior to entry] as
synonymous with 'out of this country.'" Ibid 379. Linklater v. Commis-
sioner, 36 F. (2d) 239( S. D. N. Y. 1929), accepts the construction oil
Wong Yew v. Weedin, supra. Contra: Medich v. Burmaster, 24 F. (2d)
57 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928) (alien, fifteen years resident, drove taxicab across
Canadian border, returning the same day; deportation order for crime
committed in this country "prior to entry" sustained).
2039 STAT. 875 (1917), 8 U. S. C. A. § 136 (1926); 39 SrAT. 889 (1917),
8 U. S. C. A. § 155 (1926).
21239 U. S. 3, 36 Sup. Ct. 2 (1915).
22 36 STAT. 263, § 1 (1910), Comp. STAT. (1913) § 4244.
2339 STAT. 875, § 3 (1917), 8 U. S. C. A. § 136 (i) (1926).
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provisions relating to paupers, beggers and those having physi-
cal defects likely to affect their ability to earn a living. This
change of position has done nothing to make the meaning of
the phrase more clear, but its effect is undoubtedly to weaken
the present authority of Gegiow v. Uhl -2 and to give greater
latitude to administrative discretion.2 In general the courts
interfere only when the determination of the administrator on
this ground is obviously grotesque.20
The acceptance of relief or care publicly provided is not alone
sufficient to render the alien subject to deportation.27 On the
other hand the burden of showing affirmatively that the causes
of need arose after entry may be severe.28 Aliens when they are
establishing themselves in a new society must therefore demon-
strate during the first five years an independence of social aids
of which the citizen in time of distress may avail himself with-
24 The term "is certainly now intended to cover cases like Gegiow v. Uhl
where the occasion leads to the conclusion that the alien %ill become des-
titute though generally capable of standing on his own feet." Iorio . Day,
supra, note 14, at 922. See Ex parte Horn, 292 Fed..455, 457. (W. D.
Wash. 1923), a case involving criminal misconduct, to the effect that by
the change in the statute the term is differentiated from the application
in Gegiow v. Uhl. But see Ex parte Mitchell, 256 Fed. 229, 230 (N. D. N.
Y. 1919), for the view that the meaning of the words is not changed by a
change in their position in the statute.
- The discretion lodged in administrative officials under this term has
recently been used as a most effective means for regulating immigration.
The Immigration Act of 1924 provides that immigrant's visas shall not be
issued by consular officers abroad if these officials have reason to believe
that the immigrant is inadmissible. On September 8, 1930, in view of un-
employment in the United States, consular officers were ordered to take
particular care to determine whether applicants were likely to become
public charges. Under these instructions the number of visas issued has
been sharply reduced. U. S. DAILY, Dec. 6, 1930, at 235.
26 As where a woman, in good health, self-supporting and owning prop-
erty, was ordered deported on the ground that she was likely to become
a public charge merely because of the possibility of a civil suit being
brought against her for alienation of affections. Ex parte Mitchell, supra
note 24.
27 Assurance on this point has recently been given in a letter of the
Commissioner General of Immigration stating that "where lack of em-
ployment is the only factor which has placed aliens in needy circumstances,
they incur no danger of deportation if they accept charitable aid." FonnIG.N
LANGUAGE INFORMATION SERVICE, 8 INTERPRETEIR IELEASE 16 (1931).
2S FOREIGN LANGUAGE INFORMATION SERVICE, 7 INTERPRETrit RELESqE 261
(1930). Cf. Ex parte Turner, 10 F. (2d) 816 (S. D. Cal. 1926). A man
who prior to entry had suffered from throat trouble and had had an oper-
ation for hernia became a charity patient for throat treatment after entry,
his family receiving financial assistance from a public agency. He and his
family were then ordered deported as having been at the time of entry
"likely to become a public charge." The court held that the facts consti-
tuted satisfactory evidence that the man at the time of his entry was not
physically sound or strong.
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out peril.29  The case of Canfora v. Williams 3" illustrates the
insecurity of the alien's position. A skilled workman at the
time of the proceedings had lived in the United States for fifteen
years and had raised a family of six children, who had become
wage-earners able and willing to support him and prepared to
give bond to that effect. 1 Seven years earlier, however, at a
time when his children were not self-supporting and he had al-
ready paid out large sums for private treatment, he had had a
leg amputated at Bellevue Hospital, which performed the opera-
tion without charge. Upon his return from a visit to Italy to see
his aged mother, proceedings were instituted on advice from
an apparently malicious informant -2 and he was ordered de-
ported on the ground that he was likely to become a public
charge. Though the court characterized his deportation as an
act of "cruel injustice", it held that since the law confers ex-
clusive power on the immigration officials to determine such
questions the court had no alternative but to refuse habeas
29 Any alien is subject to deportation who within five years after entry
becomes a public charge from causes not affirmatively shown to have
arisen subsequent to entry. 39 STAT. 889 (1917), & U. S. C. A. § 155
(1926).
30186 Fed. 354 (S. D. N. Y. 1911).
31 The effect of an offer to give a bond appears not to have been thor-
oughly tested in the courts. It is provided by statute that the admission of
an alien on bond when otherwise subject to exclusion as likely to become
a public charge may be permitted by the Secretary of Labor at his dis-
cretion. 39 Stat. 891 (1917), 8 U. S. C. A. § 158 (1926). In the case
of a person seeking admission whose brothers in this country offered to
give bond, it was held that the alien is either ineligible to enter or eligible
to enter without bond. Wallis v. Mannara, 273 Fed. 509 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
The court stressed the fact that the brothers were not legally liable for
the alien's support. In the case of a person committed to an insane
asylum after entry, it has been directed that the order to depart should
not be executed if his family or others should execute a bond to assure
the government that the alien would not become a public burden. Donatello
v. Commissioner, 4 F. (2d) 808 (E. D. N. Y. 1925). Such assurance would
seem to satisfy the statutory requirement as well as prevent human
tragedy in many cases.
32 It is an unfortunate aspect of the statute that it lends itself to the
purposes of persons, sometimes private individuals and sometimes officials,
acting from improper motives and that it may therefore, if abused, be-
come an instrument of persecution. See Linklater v. Commissioner, mspra
note 19, at 241 (proceedings inspired by personal enemies). "The attitude
of the examiner, the introduction of confused and voluminous testimony,
the strong indications that the appellant was vaguely regarded as unde-
sirable and that deportation was thought the easiest way to get rid of
him-all these warn us of the dangers of a system where prosecutor and
judge are one and the ordinary rules which protect the accused are in
abeyance. It is apparent how easy is the descent by short cuts to the
disposition of cases without clear legal grounds or evidence which ration-
ally proves them." Learned Hand, J. in Iorio v. Day, supra note 14, at 922,
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corpus.3 3 If the same case should arise today is seems probable
that the court might examine more closely the applicability of
the statute to the facts as found. An illustration of the result
of such examination is a construction adopted in the First Cir-
cuit, the effect of which is to give security to the alien who has
lawfully entered and who has relatives in this country legally
responsible for his support. Thus in the case of a boy committed
to a state school for defectives, whose parents were financially
responsible, it was held that the failure of the parents to pay,
whether inadvertent or intentional, was not enough to make
the child a public charge within the meaning of the statute.
The duty upon the governmental authorities was not to deport
the child but to enforce the legal obligation of the parents.2'
The tendency to restrict the application of the "public charge"
category, since the shift in its position in the statute which fol-
lowed Gegiow v. UIN,35 is conspicuous in cases where the com-
mission of a criminal offense is among the factors involved.
That criminal misconduct sufficiently establishes a likelihood of
becoming a public charge through prison confinement has been
repeatedly urged by the government and accepted in some juris-
dictions.36 In others, though the direct issue has not been set-
tled, orders resting on this ground have in some cases met judi-
cial disapproval because the facts did not support the charge.
In Lisotta v. United States, 7 for example, an Italian ordered
deported had been at all times healthy, vigorous and engaged in
"good paying hard work." Outside of a four-months jail sen-
tence for making three gallons of whiskey for his own use he
had no record of arrest. The court held that the finding that
he was "likely to become a public charge at the time of his
entry" was unsupported. In Ex parte Rodrigztez:15 two aliens
33 The opinion concludes: "But I desire to express the hope that the
immigration officials will reconsider this case. I cannot believe that on a
candid reconsideration of this record, this man, who is charged with no
offense, will be sent away because he has suffered a grievous calamity
and has been denounced by a malicious enemy, to pass his last years and
to die in a distant land far from his wife and children, and from the home
in this country in which he has lived a blameless life for so many years."
Canfora v. Williams, supra note 30, at 356.
Nocchi v. Johnson, 6 F. (2d) 1 (C. C. A. 1st, 1925).
See note 24, supra.
3'Ex parte Alachida, 277 Fed. 239 (W. D. Wash. 1921); Guimond v.
Howes, 9 F. (2d) 412 (D. Mle. 1925); see Mqdich v. Burmaster, supra
note 19, at 59. In the case of Ex parte Horn, supra, note 24, the record
was conclusive that the alien, who owned $10,000, was not likely to become
a public charge for want of means of support. The fact that he might
be prosecuted for a bootlegging conspiracy was held to bring him within
the term "likely to become a public charge."
373 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A. 5th, 1924).
3s 15 F. (2d) 878 (S. D. Texas 1926).
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had lived in this country for twenty-five years, and as man and
wife, though adulterously, for a period of fifteen years; they
conducted a profitable business and had never been in court. By
the act of crossing the bridge in the Texas border town where
they lived they exposed themselves to the hazards of exclusion
under the immigration law. The administrative finding that,
although they had been unmolested for fifteen years, they might
be convicted of adultery and thus become a public charge was
rejected by the court as doing violence to reason and common
sense.39 More recent opinions, would eliminate criminal mis-
conduct from the "public charge" category entirely," except pos-
sibly when a persistent propensity inconsistent with the pursuit
of honest means of support is shown.4 1 The basis for this view
as stated by Judge Learned in Iorio v. Day is that the phrase
"public charge" suggests "rather dependency than delinquincy"
and that "Congress has specifically dealt with crime as a ground,
and has defined what kinds are to be considered." .12 This con-
clusion was reached with full recognition of the existing con-
flict of authority and of the possibility "that the Supreme Court,
may take the broader view," but, like the result in Browne v.
Zurbrick,,43 it followed from seeking the intention of Congress
39 The warrant, however, was found "technically and legally sufficient"
on another ground: namely that the man did import the woman in order
to continue to live with her in adultery, thus constituting importing a per-
son for an immoral purpose. "I cannot refrain from saying, however,
that such a literal, drastic and harsh application of the law as this cao
furnishes was not, in my opinion, intended by the framers of it, since
under the undisputed facts these persons have been in every respect as
man and wife and would be under the laws of Texas united in a common
law marriage but for the legal impediment of their prior marriages. Cer-
tainly it is a far-fetched conclusion to arrive at that these persons who
have been in the United States for 25 years . . . have suddenly beco'e,
without any change of status whatever, inimical to the welfare of this
country and persons who ought to be removed from it." Ex parto
Rodriguez, supra note 38, at 879. It is submitted that the application of
the statute in this case when a mere continuance in a long established re-
lationship is involved, might be found not only drastic but improper.
4 0 Lisotta v. U. S., supra note 6; Coykendall v. Skrmetta, 22 F. (2d) 120
(C. C. A. 5th, 1927); Iorio v. Day, supra note 14; see Browne v. Zurbrick,
supra note 11, at 933.
- In a case decided before the act of 1917 the category was deemed to
include "not only those persons who through misfortune cannot be self-
supporting but also those who will not undertake honest pursuits, and who
are likely to become periodically the inmates of prisons." U. S. v. Willian's
175 Fed. 274, 275 (S. D. N. Y. 1910); of. Lam Fung Yen v. Frick, 233
Fed. 393 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916) (professional gambler) distinguished in
Browne v. Zurbrick, supra note 11, at 933, where the offense was a "single
crime, not of the continuing type, and involving no prospect of the prison




where it appears to be expressed most deliberately and from
excluding doubtful interpretations.
III. LIMITS OF DISCRETION IN THE EXECUTION OF
DEPORTATION ORDERS
While a deportation statute can have no legitimate object except
to secure the removal of undesired aliens," the consequences of
deportation under the present statutes may be far more serious
than mere compulsory departure. Under legislation -enacted in
1929 the alien ordered deported is forever barred from re-entry
and may be convicted of a felony for attempt to return 3 Thus
a deportation order becomes a decree of perpetual banishment
and exile regardless of the alien's ties in this country. But the
consequences to the individual may be most acute because of the
circumstances confronting him in the country to which he is
ordered returned. In this connection the following questions
arise: (1) is it mandatory for the Secretary of Labor in all
cases to order compulsory deportation? (2) to what country or
countries does the statute require deportation to be made; and
(3), if return to the designated port is shown to expose the alien
to severe consequences, and even death, may the order be dis-
turbed by the courts? While the wording of the statute is man-
datory, as a matter of administrative practice voluntary de-
44 The right of states to exclude or expel aliens, or to admit them on such
terms as they may choose to prescribe, is generally admitted in inter-
national law and rests on the principles of sovereignty and self-preserva-
tion. Ekiu v. U. S., spru, note 5. Even the most recent efforts to promote
international economic co-operation by improving the position of aliens are
confined to proposals respecting the position of the alien after establish-
ment. INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE TREATANENT OF ForEIGNIIS,
DRM1F CONVENTION (1929), Preamble and Article 6. Nevertheless "the
act of expulsion ought to conform to its direct, essential object which is
to relieve the soil of an obnoxious guest. The right of national sovereignty
does not require or permit more." Rolin-Jacquemyns, 20 REVUE DE IOIT
INTERNATIONAL (1898) 498 et seq. That an abitrary or unnecessarily in-
jurious exercise of the right to deport is repugnant to international law
has been maintained by the United States in the conduct of its relations
with other countries, and such an exercise of power has frequently given
rise to claims and to awards by international tribunals. Bonci,=r, DiLO-
=ATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD (1916) §§ 27-31; Moom, 4 DicEST
OF IkTERNATIONAL LAW (1906) §§ 550-551; BoUVx, op. cit. mipra note 6,
3-14.
4345 STAT. 1551 (1929), as amended by 46 STAT. 41 (1929), 8 U. S. C.
_4A § 150 (1930, Supp.). The rigidity, and consequent harshness of this
provision, has been criticized by administrative authorities. REPORT OF
THE COMISSIONER OF IMMIGIATION (1930) at 48; Address of P. F. Snyder,
Assistant to the Secretary, U. S. Dep't of Labor, 7 INTERPRETER RELRA;Es
(1930) 132-133. This change in the law is particularly noted in Browne
v. Zurbrick, svpra note 11, at 932, as a reason for a strict construction of
statutory grounds for deportation.
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partures have been very generally permitted.4 As to the sec-
ond question, the Secretary is given the option of deporting the
alien to the country whence he came or to the foreign port at
which he embarked, with special provisions in case of entrance
from foreign contiguous territory and with the condition that
the country to which the alien is to be sent will consent to re-
ceive him. 47 There is nothing in the statute to indicate that Con-
gress intended that its designation of countries to which the
alien should be returned should be the means of inflicting addi-
tional hardship upon him; on the contrary an intent to provide
humanely and even generously for the restoration of the alien
to the place where he may most readily establish himself may
be argued.48
The case of Lewis v. Frick -1 decided by the Supreme Court in
1914, while authority for the proposition that the terms of an
order cannot be varied according to the wishes of the alien, ex-
pressly left undecided the question whether the statute allowed
room for the exercise of discretion on the part of the Secretary
in view of the facts of the case. No issue of special hardship
likely to be encountered at the destination specified was pre-
sented. In Karmian v. Curran o in 1927 the Court of Appeals
in the Second Circuit modified an order to return to Turkish
territory an Armenian who had previously been cruelly tortured
there. It was able to find on the facts of the case that France
was the country "whence he came." The decision of the lower
46 See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION (1930) at 22;
(1929) at 20; (1928) at 17; SNYDER, ADDRESS, stupra note 45, at 134.
47 39 STAT. 890 (1917), 8 U. S. C. A. § 156 (1926).
48 In this connection may be noted Bureau of Immigration General Or-
der No. 168, Feb. 16, 1931, announcing that the government is prepared
to repatriate at government expense aliens who have been in this country
less than three years and who, from causes arising subsequent to entry,
have fallen into distress or are in need of public aid. The arrangement
is authorized by the Immigration Act. 39 STAT. 892 (1917), 8 U. S. C. A.
§ 102 (1926).
49 233 U. S. 291, 34 Sup. Ct. 488 (1914). The case concerned a Russian,
six years resident in the United States, who made a re-entry from Canada.
The deportation order called for his return to Canada. The court, while
remarking on the lack of clearness in the statute, held that the destination
should not be controlled by the adventitious circumstance of the fact that
he came from Canada at the time of the second entrance.
The case illustrates sharply the difference between criminal and de-
portation precedure, and the indisposition of the Supreme Court, as shown
in the Ju Toy case, to disturb the conclusion of the administrative author-
ities. The deportation order was issued on the ground that the alien
imported a woman for immoral purposes. In spite of the fact that he had
been criminally tried and acquitted on the same charge, the court held
that the Secretary was justified in concluding from the evidence that the
alien's story as to his "wife" was pure fabrication.
50 16 F. (2d) 958 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
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court,51 however, directing that the alien be permitted to return
voluntarily to France, was reversed as error. "Deportation
means compulsory action ... [He] should be sent, not politely
permitted to go as he pleases." Z2 But the Court of Appeals was
careful to point out that, if it should prove impossible to send
him to France, other destinations were possible and concluded:
"We further feel it right very pointedly to call to the attention of
the Secretary what weight of responsibility for human woe tha
statute places on his shoulders... We publicly hope for the ex-
haustion of every possibility, including Congressional action, be-
fore this man is doomed to the land of his birth." 3 The more
recent case of Giletti v. Conumissioner r', though not favorable to
the petition before the court, contains far more lenient implica-
tions. Approval is indicated, though guardedly, for the construc-
tion that "when deported in invitinm the alien must go to one of
the prescribed countries, but it (the stafute) need not be exe-
cuted when the same result is accomplished by his going else-
where." 55 Moreover there is a clear intimation that the court
might, under circumstances which are specified, review the ac-
tion of the Secretary as to the manner of securing the departure
of the alien, provided "abuse of discretion" be shown. The case
presented was that of an Anti-Fascist resisting deportation to
Italy who had, however, failed to show to what country he
wished to go, that he could secure the means of transportation,
that the other country if selected would admit him, or that it
would be remote enough to insure against re-entry. Without
these facts, the court stated, it was without the means of saying
that the Secretary ought not to send him to Italy.
The opinion is of great interest because the facts indicated
as pre-requisite to passing upon the order of the Secretary as
to destination are present in the pending Serio case.-- In this
51 S. D. N. Y. Not reported.
'o2 Supra note 50, at 961.
53 Ibid 961.
5435 F. (2d) 6S7 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929).
r-'The argument presented for this construction rests on the provision
in the Act of March 7, 1929, as amended June 24, 1929 (45 Stat. 1551 as
amended by 46 STAT. 41, 8 U. S. A. § 180 (1930, Supp.) that an alien
"ordered deported" shall be deemed to have been so deported, if he "has left
the United States ... irrespective of the source from which the exTenses
of his transportation were defrayed or of the place to which he departed,"
the contention being that this gave countenance to the practice, which
has long existed, by which the Secretary in his discretion allows the order
to remain unexecuted, if the alien voluntarily leaves for another country
at his own expense. See note 46, supra. Of this interpretation, the opinion
says: "This appears to us certainly a humane construction to put upon the
statute, and we will not say that it is too much of a strain upon its lang-
uage."
56 District Court, Southern District, New York, per Bondy, J., Dec. 16,
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case, which is being carried to the Court of Appeals in the Sec-
ond Circuit, the Secretary of Labor is insistent on sending an
alien to Italy in spite of the fact that there is said to be a decree
of death against him in that country and in spite of the fact
that funds are assured for sending him to Russia which is pre-
pared to admit him. This is clearly a case in which judicial in-
terference can be supported only by reason of the prospective
consequences of the order. It may be contended that, so long as
alternative methods of enforcing departures are open, the order
is an arbitrary and unwarranted abuse of administrative discre-
tion. Or it may be argued that such extreme treatment, wholly
unnecessary to the object of the statute and at variance with
developing principles of international law relating to the treat-
ment of aliens,57 cannot in the absence of the mot specific stipu-
lation be regarded as authorized by Congress.
The result in the Serio case may well turn on the recognition
of the desirability of judicial protection of individual rights in
the enforcement of statutes which, in pursuance of legitimate
objectives, vest in administrative officers authority to alter the
arrangements of human lives in great number. Browne v. Zur-
bick and other recent cases indicate a disposition to afford in-
creased protection in the case of aliens long resident in this
country. The beneficial effect of such decisions is to give as-
surance to aliens that the hazards which must be overcome to
assure their establishment in this country will not be increased
by governmental agents acting arbitrarily or under dubious
authority, and this assurance cannot fail to be important in de-
termining their attitude toward existing legal and political in-
stitutions. The Serio case, on the other hand, promises a test
of the presumptive rights of that individual, legally most naked,
the alien whose own citizenship offers him no protection and who
has acquired no foothold in the land where his fate is tried. A
system which contemplates the exercise by administrative officials
of wide powers such as are conferred on immigration officials 61 in
deportation cases will be in the long run strengthened rather
1930. Not reported. For particulars of the case see A1aIsICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION, BULLETINS (1930-31) 428, 436, 450. N. Y. Herald-
Tribune, April 11, 1931.
57 See BORCHARD, op. cit. supra note 41, at 51, 57.
cs "It is a power to be administered, not arbitrarily and secretly, but
fairly and openly, -under the restraints of the tradition and principles of
free government applicable where the fundamental rights of men are in-
volved regardless of their origin or race. It is the province of the courts, in
proceedings for review, within the limits amply defined in the cases cited,
to prevent abuse of this extraordinary power." Kwock Jan Fat v. White,
supra note 6, at 464, 40 Sup. Ct. at 570 (referring to the power of the
Secretary of Labor over Chinese persons and persons of Chinese descent).
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than hampered by a vigilant insistence on the part of the courts
that these powers be not abused. Only so, under present
governmental machinery, can the expedition considered essential
to the manifold operations of the modern state be secured with-
out the destruction of safeguards upon which in the last analysis
both social and individual security depend.
PATENT POOLS AND THE SHERALN ACT
IT not infrequently occurs in certain industries that many
patents are rendered useless-"blocked"-by other patents ad-
versely owned which cover vitally related features of the manu-
facturing process or finished process, a situation which may re-
sult in expensive infringement suits or in an enhancement of
prices in order to insure manufacturers against the possibility
of such litigation.1 The patent pool is of great economic utility in
relieving this so-called "congestion" of patents, the expenses of
which are shifted to the consumer.2  Aloreoer, in its most
elementary aspect, the patent pool is a voluntary dissolution of
many individual monopolies, and thus may create competition by
bestowing upon many the full enjoyment of technological ad-
vances.3 Though patent pools have on occasion been charged
with destroying the incentive among manufacturers to produce
or acquire innovations, 4 this inference is not generally supported
by experience; for, in fact, the manufacturer who first acquires
a patent almost always enjoys the substantial advantage of be-
ing the first to be able to embody it into his product or process.5
But it is not denied that the patent pool has often been
employed to eliminate competition among owners of competing
1 Trade Associations, Their Economic Significance and Legal Status,
NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD (1925) 127, 128; Kinsir, TIMDE
ASSOCIATIONS: THE LEGAL ASPECTs (1928); Lamb, The Relation of the
Patent Law to the Federal Anti-Trust Laws (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 261.
2 The patent-pool constitutes one of the major functions of many trade
associations. KIRSH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 126. Important patent pools
now exist in the automobile, radio, and aviation industry. See Trade As-
sociation Activities, U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE (1927) 176 (automobiles);
REPORT OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION ON TWIE RADI INDUSTRY (192 )
C. 2, Appendices; 31 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENEIL
(1917) 166 (aviation).
3 See Blount Mlfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 16G Fed. 555, 557 (C.
C. D. Mass. 1909); KIRSH, op. cit. supra note 1, at 144. See the remarks
of Frank H. Russel, president of the Manufacturers Aircraft Association,
Inc., N. Y. Times, April 15, 1931, at 24.
4 VAUGHAN, ECONOMICS OF OUR PATENT SYSTEM (1925) 210.
Trade Associations, Their Economic Significance and Legal Status,
supra note 1, at 147.
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patents, or to develop an even more extensive monopoly than
that inherent in the individual patents, thus materially affecting
the cost at which the public receives their benefits.
Patent owners may license one another, either directly or
through some trust arrangement, imposing on such mutual li-
censes conditions affecting the price, output, or sales of the
patented product,7 or simply exacting exorbitant royalties from
one another.8 As these factors must be reckoned with in comput-
ing the ultimate selling price, it will be enhanced to that extent.
The participants in a pool may also be engaged in the business
of marketing a process by licensing others to use it. By stipu-
lating in the pooling agreements the royalties to be charged sub-
licensees, and by dividing such fees,9 they may eliminate com-
petition among themselves, or, retaining some measure of com-
petition, will at least succeed in eliminating price competition.
The legality of these various types of patent pools is a matter
of some complexity. 0 A patentee clearly enjoys a limited mon-
opoly 11 which privileges him to impose many restrictions on the
use, manufacture and sale of his patented article that might
otherwise be illegal under the Sherman Act.12 Nevertheless this
6 Indeed one author defines a patent pool as "designed to restrain trade."
VAUGHAN, Op. cit. sgpra note 5, at 34.
7 Cf. National Harrow Co. v. Hench, 83 Fed. 36 (C. C. A. 3d, 1897);
Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., supra note 3; Standard Sani-
tary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 33 Sup. Ct. 9 (1912).
s Cf. United States v. Discher, Federal Anti-Trust Laws and Decisions,
Dep't of Justice (1928) 147. Later decision in same case, 255 Fed. 719
(S. D. N. Y. 1919) (application for amended decree denied). The patent
pool of the Automobile Bumper Association involved in this case is de-
scribed in T'ade Associations: Their Economic Significance and Legal
Status, supra note 1, at 140.
9 Cf. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United States, 51 Sup. Ct., 421 (U.
S. 1931).
10 The legality of patent consolidations is beyond the scope of this com-
ment. See VAUGHAN, op. cit. supra note 4, c. 3. A vertical combination in
one corporation of non-competing or supplementary patents is apparently
legal. United States v. Winslow, 227 U. S. 202, 33 Sup. Ct. 253 (1913);
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32, 38 Sup. Ct.
473 (1918). But cf. United Shoe Machinery Co. v. La Chapelle, 212
Mass. 467, 99 N. E.'289 (1912). The acquisition by purchase of competing
patents, however, so as to eliminate competition has apparently never been
adjudicated. Cf. United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 226 Fed. 62 (W. D.
N. Y. 1915); Note (1924) 24 CoL. L. REV. 654.
"See Heaton-Peninsular Button Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co.,
77 Fed. 288, 290 (C. C. A. 6th 1896). For a discussion of the alleged con-
flict between the Sherman Act and the patent statutes, see Lamb, op. cit.
supra note 1.
12 United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U. S. 476, 47 Sup. Ct. 192
(1926) (stipulation at what price patent licensee must sell patented arti-
cle) ;. Bement v. National Harrow Co., 186 U. S. 70, 22 Sup. Ct. 747 (1902)
(limitations on licensee's production).
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individual legal monopoly may be abused so as to run afoul of
the Sherman Act. 3 When several patent owners combine, re-
strictions which could be legally imposed by each individual
patentee may be illegal when enforced through the combina-
tion because "the restraint of trade or monopoly arises from com-
bination, and not from the exercise of rights granted by letters
patent"; 14 a fortiori, if a patent pool attempts to restraint trade
to an even greater degree than that allowed an individual
patentee, it is clearly within the prohibition of the anti-trust
laws.15 Because of the difficulty of determining the exact extent
of the patent monopoly, the operative facts that will constitute
an abuse of concentrated patent power through a pool are of
necessity unusually vague.,' The few cases in which this ques-
tion has been raised in the past concerned only the more dras-
tic practices by which combinations may restrain trade, such
as out-right price fixing and limitation of production, and patent
pools containing such agreements have been quite generally found
illegal.'. The status of pools that may accomplish the same re-
sult by the less obvious method of fixing royalties has until
recently been a matter of mere speculation.
The Supreme Court, in the recent case of Stmzdard Oil Co. of
1" Bauer v. O'Donnell, 229 U. S. 1, 33 Sup. Ct. 616 (1913) (price fixing
after patentee has sold the patented article); Motion Picture Patents Co.
v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U. S. 502, 37 Sup. Ct. 416 (1917) (condi-
tion that licensee use patented article only in connection with a particular
unpatented article); United Shoe Machinery Corporation v. United
States, 258 U. S. 451, 42 Sup. Ct. 363 (1922) ("tying" clauses). Cf. "s
STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 14 (1926) (Clayton Act); Lamb, op cit.
supra note 1; Comment (1928) 33 YALE L. J. 246; Comment (1931) 40
YALE L. J. 954.
14 See Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., supra note 3, at 562;
Standard Sanitary Alfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 48, .'3 Sup.
Ct. at 14; United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., 22,5 Fed. 800, 806.
(E. D. Pa. 1915). But see Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber
Works Co., 154 Fed. 358, 363 (C. C. A. 7th, 1907). This is also true of
combinations based on copyrights. Straus v. American Publi~hers' Aszo-
ciation, 231 U. S. 222, 34 Sup. Ct. 34 (1913).
'15 See Standard Sanitary lfg. Co. v. United Statez, supra note 7, at 48;
33 Sup. Ct. at 14.
16 See United States v. Motion Picture Patents' Co., smpra note 14, at 806.
17 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra note 7; National
Harrow Co. v. Quick, 67 Fed. 130 (C. C. D. Ind. 1895); National Harrow
Co. v. Hench, supra note 7; Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., supra
note 3; United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co., supra note 14; Vulcan
Powder Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 96 Cal. 510, 31 Pac. 581 (1892);
State v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co., 110 Minn. 415, 126 N. W. 126 (1910) ;
cf. United States v. New Departure Mfg. Co., 201 Fed. 107 (W. D. N. Y.
1913); But cf. Massie et al v. Asbestos Brake Co., 95 N. J. Eq. 298, 12=1 AtI.
155 (1922); Lamb, op. cit. supra note 1, at 279; Comment (1928) 38 YAL=
L. J. 246.
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Indiana v. United States 18 has had occasion for the first time to
consider the legality of an extensive system of patent-inter-
change embodying just such restrictions. Four principal
owners of patented processes for producing "cracked" gasoline
executed cross-license agreements covering their patents. Each
of the patent owners thereby acquired the right to use the
patents of the others in its process; each was empowered to sub-
license manufacturers with the patents acquired; and the own-
ers, as well as the sub-licensees, who were named as secondary
defendants were released from all liability for past and future
infringements. The royalties to be charged both primary and
secondary defendants were fixed by the contracts, and the fees
received therefrom were to be divided among the owners at
fixed, though unequal proportions. The District Court, accept-
ing the Government's figures that the defendants produced
eighty per cent of the "cracked" gasoline of the country, held
that their control of the patents through the pool enabled them
to control output and prices, and was hence illegal.1" The Su-
preme Court concluded that as "cracked" gasoline represented
only twenty-six per cent of the total gasoline output, with which
it was in direct competition, the defendants could-not effectively
control the price and output of gasoline through the pool, even
if the Government's questionable estimate were accepted. It
accepted the findings of the master that the patents had been
acquired in good faith, and not as a pretext for "lending color of
legality" to the combination. Moreover, the court found that the
evidence failed to establish a monopoly or restriction of competi-
tion in the business of licensing patented cracking processes.2"
is Supra note 9. This decision is also the first by the Supreme Court con-
cerning cross-licensing agreements.
19 33 Fed. (2d) 617 (N. D. Ill. 1929); Note (1929) 39 YAL.e L, J. 290.
It is to be observed that certain provisions in the cross-licensing contracts
on which the District Court based its decision had been formally cancelled
by the defendants when the case reached the Supreme Court. These con-
cerned territorial restrictions, options to purchase, and blanket acknowl-
edgements of patent validity. The Supreme Court held regarding these
cancelled agreements that "as the relief . . . sought is an injunction, and
hence relates only to the future, the alleged validity of such provisions ha,
become moot." Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United States, supra note 9,
at 428. As a result of this decision sub-licensees of the primary defendants
set up the illegality of the cross-licensing agreements as a defense to a
suit for royalties. The defense was held to be unavailing as the contract
sued on was independent of the alleged illegal agreements. Gasoline Prod-
ucts Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 46 F. (2d) 511 (D. Me. 1931).
20 This result was reached because the primary defendants owned or
licensed only fifty-five per cent of total cracking capacity, the remainder
being distributed among twenty-ori~ndependently owned cracking processes.
If the defendants had controlled a larger fraction of the industry, it is
conceivable that an illegal restraint of trade in the licensing business alone,
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Because of these findings, it reversed the District Court on the
ground that where there is no "definite factual showing of illegal-
ity" the Sherman Act is not violated.
This is substantially the same policy as that adopted by the
Supreme Court towards open price associations and trade in-
formation exchanges, which have recently been given a clean
bill of health.21 The mere fact that price-fixing and other illegal
restraints may be rendered easier by the agreements does not
vitiate them; 22 it is only when such illegal activities are in fact
pursued that the court will grant relief under the Sherman Act.23
The assumption implicit in such an attitude is that the Govern-
ment will be able to cope effectively with abuses of concentrated
patent power when they arise.
Many obstacles, however, that may prove will nigh insur-
mountable, beset the prosecution of an illegal patent pool that
comprises only royalty-fixing covenants. In the first place, it is
necessary, as indicated above, to prove more than mere monopoly,
or practices which in the absence of patents might be unreason-
able restraints of trade; it must be shown that the pool has ex-
ceeded the legal monopolies and privileges conferred by its
patents 2 ---the exact extent of which is extremely tenuous.
The unquestioned right of an individual patentee to charge
as high a royalty as the traffic will bear will undoubtedly
color such proceedings. If it is urged that the royalties are
onerous,-6 and have no relation to the true value of the patents,
which may have affected the ultimate selling price only slightly, might
have resulted.
21 Maple Flooring Manufacturers' Association v. United States, 268 U. S.
563, 45 Sup. Ct. 578 (1925); Cement Manufacturers' Protective Associa-
tion v. United States, 268 U. S. 588, 45 Sup. Ct. 586 (1925). But cf.
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup.
Ct. 114 (1921); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U. S. 371,
43 Sup. Ct. 607 (1923).
2 But price fixing, even when the prices are reasonable, is illegal.
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U. S. 392, 47 Sup. Ct. 377
(1927).
23 Cf. Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U. S. 231, 38 Sup.
Ct. 242 (1918).
24 See cases cited supra note 14.
.5 Columbia Wire Co. v. Freeman Wire Co., 71 Fed. 302 (C. C. E. D.
Mo. 1895). It is worthy of note, moreover,°that the Government in the
Standard Oil case conceded the validity of the royalties exacted by the
primary defendants from one another, directing its attack solely against
the fixing of royalties to be charged sub-licensees, and a division of the
fees to be thus derived.
26 This contention was made in the Standard Oil ease, and the court in-
dicates that it may be a vital factor in this type of case. It stated: "Un-
less the industry is dominated or interstate commerce directly restrained,
the Sherman Act does not require cross-licensing patentees to license at
reasonable rates others engaged in interstate commerc." Standard Oil Co.
of Indiana v. United States, supra note 9, at 425.
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but are merely a means of enhancing prices, the court is faced
with the intensely difficult task of assessing the value of pat-
ents 27-- an evaluation that admits of wide diversity of opinion.
The further question of the good faith of the patentees in en-
tering the pool for the legitimate purpose of avoiding infringe-
ment suits-a question that was raised in the Standard Oil case
and in almost every other case involving patent pools 2&-in-
volves many of the baffling problems of ordinary patent litiga-
tion, such as whether the patents were actually infringed.
Evasion of the Sherman Act may thus be quite possible through a
patent pool based on more or less unimportant, or even invalid
patents 22 for the alleged purpose of avoiding infringement suits.
In addition to these hazards peculiar to patent pools, the funda-
mental necessity of showing that domination exists is often ex-
tremely difficult in certain industries. In the Standard Oil case,
for instance, it was impossible even after several years of litiga-
tion to ascertain from the available statistics what proportion of
"cracked" gasoline the defendants produced.3o And it seems well
established as the result of the case of Cement Manufactuirers'
Association v. United States that the mere showing of uniform
prices is not conclusive of illegality.3 Moreover, a single victory
27 This difficulty, indeed, has been the chief stumbling-block in the suc-
cessful maintenance of patent pools. See TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, TIiIR
ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE AND LEGAL STATUS, supra note 1, at 145. One
m@thod of obviating such difficulties that has been resorted to is the uge
of a compulsory arbitration board to assess the royalties. Its use by the
Manufacturers' Aircraft Association has received the approval of the De-
partment of Justice. 31 OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERALS,
supra note 2, at 170 (1917). At least one important patent interchange,
that sponsored by the National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, is
organized on a non-royalty basis. Trade Association Activities, U. S. DE'T
OF COMMERCE (1927) 176.
28 See National Harrow Co. v. Hench, gupra note 7 at 38; United States v.
New Departure Mfg. Co., supra note 17 at 114; Standard Sanitary Mfg.j
Co. v. United States, supra note 7, at 41, 33 Sup. Ct. at 15.
29 In this connection, it may be pointed out that contracts acknowledging
patent validity are probably illegal. Cf. Pope v. Gormully, 144 U. S. 224,
12 .Sup. Ct. 637 (1892). Yet almost every patent pool will undoubtedly
tend to decrease suits against invalid patents that have been assigned to the
pool. Moreover, a patent pool extends to a larger number of patents the
protection from successful attack that a powerful owner of patents often
enjoys over an impecunious owner of a competing patent. Cf. VAUGHAN,
.op. cit. supra note 4, at 81.
30 The estimates of the proportion produced by the primary defendants
during 1924 ranged from 66.1 per cent to 81.04 per cent, while the court
intimates that both of these figures are probably inaccurate. Sufficient
data for determining the production of the secondary defendants was lack-
ing. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United States, supra note 9, at 427,
n. 17.
31 See Cement Manufacturers' Association v. United States, supra note
21, at 605; 45 Sup. Ct. at 592.
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gained by a potentially illegal combination, as in the instant case,
is apt to deter prosecution at some later date when it does in fact
grow in size so as to dominate the industry, or exercises its latent
possibilities for illegal action2
The patent pool, as well as other cooperative business activ-
ities, thus presents the double-headed aspect of legitimate con-
structive economies, and of dangerous potentialities for cleverly
disguised restraints of trade. In distinguishing between their
legal and illegal pursuits, on the basis of fact, the Supreme Court
has undoubtedly aided what is generally considered a healthy
trend in modern business. But it is believed that this has been
at the expense of effective enforcement of the Sherman Act
because of the manifold difficulties of piercing the veil of appar-
ent innocuousness behind which illegal activities of this nature
may be hidden.3 3 This is especially true of the patent pool. The
clear recognition by the Court that practices declared legal may
under other circumstances be illegal, and its avowed intention
to subject these activities to careful scrutiny 31 may serve, how-
ever, as a deterrent to abusive combinations, if for no other
reason than to avoid the costly defense of prosecutions.
THE PETTY OFFENSE CATEGORY AND TRILU BY JURY
THE United States Supreme Court has recently had occasion to
express itself upon two issues of present-day importance to the
administration of criminal justice-waiver of jury trial and the
differentiation of petty and serious offenses as criteria of jury
right. In Patton v. United States,' during a trial for conspiracy
to bribe a federal prohibition agent, a penitentiary offense, one
of the jurors fell ill. With the consent of both parties, the trial
was continued with eleven jurors. The Supreme Couit, identi-
32 Thus, in the gasoline industry, it is probable that the proportion of
gasoline refined by the cracking process will increase rapidly so that the
cross-licensing agreement held legal in the Standard Oil case may become
an effective means of restraining trade.
33 For a strong criticism of this policy with regard to open price associa-
tions, etc., see Probst, Thw Failure of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, (1920)
75 U. of PA. L. Rav. 122; ef. Oliphant, Trade Assoeiatimzs and The Law.
(1926) 26 COL. L. REV. 381.
34 Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphatically stated that evasion
of the anti-trust laws by resort to any disguise or subterfuge will not be
sanctioned. See United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. 100, 181,
31 Sup. Ct. 632, 649, (1911). A suit has been brought by the Government
in the District Court of Delaware against the alleged monopoly created
by the radio cross-licensing agreements. United States v. Radio Corpora-
tion of America, In Equity No. 793. See Comment (1931) 40 YALE L. J.
958.
1281 U. S. 276, 50 Sup. Ct. 253 (1930). See (1930) 30 COL. L. RE%,. 1003.
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fying the consent to trial by the remaining jurors with a com-
plete waiver of jury,2 held that the right to a jury could be
waived in the trial of serious as well as petty offenses. In
District of Columbia v. Colts,3 the accused, charged with having
operated a motor vehicle recklessly and at a prohibited rate of
speed, was tried before a police court without a jury, over his
protest. Although the maximum punishment for the offense
was a fine of $100 or 30 days in jail, the Supreme Court held
that the accused was entitled to a jury on the ground that the
offense charged was "an act of such obvious depravity that to
characterize it was a petty offense and thus triable summarily
would be to shock the general moral sense." 4
The Patton case brings the support of the highest federal
court to recent trends toward greater freedom in waiving the
jury. That state cdurts have reached conflicting results on this
question may be ascribed largely to peculiarities of the consti-
tutional and legislative problems involved in each case.- Several
states have ek:press constitutional or legislative provision for
waiver, 6 and the courts have generally given these full effect."
In rare cases courts have reached the same result even without
statutory authority.8 On the whole the experience of states
which allow waiver goes far to justify the practice at least on
the ground of administrative expedience.0 Hitherto, however,
the federal courts have consistently adhered to the anomalous
practice of allowing waiver of the constitutional right to jury
trial only where no such right exists-that is, in the trial of
petty offenses. 10 The clear-cut recognition and approval in the
2 It has been pointed out that the case could have been decided on the
ground of procedural irregularity, without invoking questions of policy
and constitutionality. See (1930) 44 HARv. L. REV. 124.
3 51 Sup. Ct. 52 (U. S. 1930). See (1931) 79 U. PA. L. REV. 641.
4 51 Sup. Ct. at 53. A suggestion that an analogous offense of driving
a horse recklessly was indictable at common law is supported only by a
dictum in the case cited. See (1931) 31 COL. L. REV. 325.
r See Oppenheim, Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal Cases (1927)
25 MiCH. L. REV. 695, 699; Perkins, Proposed Jury Changes in Criminal
Cases (1931) 16 IowA L. BULL. 20, 40.
6 See collection of statutes in AJERIcAN LAW INSTITUTE CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 2, 250-252 (1929).
T People v. Fisher, 340 Ill. 250, 172 N. E. 722 (1930) ; People v. Hender-
son, 246 lich. 481, 224 N. W. 628 (1929); Ex parte King, 274 Pac. 682
(Okla. Cr. App. 1929).
8 State v. Teideman, 49 S. D. 356, 207 N. W. 153 (1926).
9 See Bond, The Maryland Practice of Trying Criminal Cases by Judges
Aone Without Juries (1925) 11 A. B. A. J. 699. For an interesting com-
pilation of statistics on the operation of the waiver system, see Goldberg,
Waiver of Jury in Felony Trials (1930) 28 Mici. L. REV. 163.
10 Schick v. United States, 195 U. S. 65, 24 Sup. Ct. 826 (1904) (allowed
in petty offense); Low v. United States, 169 Fed. 86 (C. C. A. 6th 1909)
(disallowed in serious offense).
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Patton case of the power to waive a jury in the trial of serious
offenses makes even more striking the decision of the same court
in the Colts case, which gives effect to a somewhat inconsistent
policy by reducing the category of petty offenses, triable sum-
marily.
The Federal Constitution provides that "the trial of all crimes
... shall be by jury," 11 and that "in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury." 12 Corresponding provisions of state consti-
tutions have for the most part adopted similar phraseology."3
It has been well-settled, however, that this guaranty is to be in-
terpreted in the light of the common law, 4 and such a construc-
tion excludes from the application of the provision that indefinite
category of crimes known as petty offenses, triable without a
jury before the adoption of the constitution.'* The historical
background invoked as a basis for this interpretation therefore
provides the test for crimes known to the common law. The
inadequacy of pre-constitutional records tends to obscure the
contemporary practices, but it is clear that justices sitting with-
out a jury had some sort of criminal jurisdiction, and the fre-
quency of offenses such as drunkenness and vagrancy have at
least assured the survival of the form of their trial. O Although
in specific instances it might prove difficult as a matter of re-
search to ascertain whether or not, prior to the constitution, a
particular offense was customarily tried with or without a jury,
nevertheless the test permits a categorical answer. 7 Conversely,
determination of the mode of trial of statutory offenses unknown
to the common law is discretionary with the legislature,e unless
the offense is analogited by the court to a crime triable to the
jury before the constitution. 9 Under the same theory of
strangeness to the common law, violations of municipal ordi-
11 U. S. CONST., ART. III, § 2, cl. 3.
12 U. S. CONST., AMENDMENT VI.
'3 See 1 HYATT, TRIALs (1924) 418.
14 See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U. S. 540, 549, 8 Sup. Ct. 1301, 1303 (1888).
15 Schick v. United States, svpa note 10. See Frankfurter and Corcor-
an, Petty Federal Offenscs and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by
Jury (1926) 39 HARV. L. REV. 917.
1r See Frankfurter and Corcoran, op. cit. supra note 15 at 937 et seq.
17 Cf. City of Mt. Sterling v. Holly, 108 Ky. 621, 57 S. W. 491 (1900)
(disorderly conduct); People v. Harding, 115 Misc. 298, 189 N. Y. Supp.
657 (Erie Co. Ct. 1921) (vagrancy). See Profatt, JuRY TRIAL (1877) §
87; Barbour, MAGISTRATES' CRnaNAL LAW (1841) 509.
is Bell v. State, 104 Neb. 203, 176 N. W. 544 (1920) (liquor act); Caruso
v. Porter, 102 N. J. L. 71, 130 Atl. 803 (1925) (driving while intoxicated);
Commonwealth v. Andrews, 211 Pa. 110, 60 Atl. 554 (1905) (Food and Drug
Act).
29 Bowden v. Nugent, 26 Ariz. 485, 226 Pac. 549 (1924). See 1 Coo=,





nances have been almost invariably tried summarily,2 even
though the offense be a separate and serious crime against state
law.21
Upon this purely historical analysis a few states have super-
imposed a further distinction between petty and serious offenses,
based arbitrarily on the type or magnitude of the penalty in-
volved. Thus in some states a jury may be dispensed with only
so long as a fine without imprisonment is fixed as the maximum
punishment; 22 in others, summary trial is barred where the
maximum fine exceeds a stated amount.2 3
The federal courts, however, while achieving results substan-
tially similar to those reached by the state courts, have adopted
a somewhat more flexible test to distinguish the categories,
namely, the moral nature of the offense, determined only in
part by the severity of the penalty. 4  When faced with a crime
indictable at common law, 25 but embarrased by the theoretic lack
of a common law, they evolved the moral nature concept, either
as a too literal adaptation of the misleading malum prohibitum-
malum in se classification, which had long before completed its
period of usefulness,22 or as an attempt to deduce an intrinsic
meaning from the felony-misdemeanor nomenclature.21 For the
most part cases in which this test has been applied could have
been disposed of on the basis of the penalty exacted, since, with
few exceptions, the only offenses for which the federal courts
have required a jury trial have carried with them penalties of
twice the magnitude of those involved in the most severely pun-
ished offenses which have been held petty.28
20Natal v. Louisiana, 139 U. S. 621, 11 Sup..Ct. 636 (1891); City of
St. Paul v. Robinson, 129 Minn. 383, 152 N.W. 777 (1915); Ex parto
Sloan, 47 Nev. 109, 217 Pac. 233 (1923). Cf. Ex parte State ex rel City of
Birmingham, 164 Ala. 576, 51 So. 309 (1909). See 2 BisuoP, N.w CRiMi-
NAL PROCEDURE (2d ed. 1913) 892.
21 State v. Anderson, 165 Minn. 150, 206 N. W. 51 (1926); Ex parto
Simmons, 5 Okla. Cr. 399, 115 Pac. 380 (1911). See HYATT, op. cit. supra
note 13, at 482.
22 State v. Kilshaw, 158 La. 203, 103 So. 740 (1925); Weimer v. State,
118 Ohio 129, 160 N. E. 623 (1928). This distinction has been criticized
as too arbitrary. See Note (1929) 3 CIN. L. REV. 215.
23 Ward v. City of Tulsa, 24 Okla. Cr. 77, 216 Pac. 173 (1923). The
District of Columbia has such a limitation. D. C. CODE (1930) TIT. 18,
c. 4, § 165.
24 Schick v. United States, supra note 10; Coates v. United States, 290
Fed. 134 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923).
25 Callan v. Wilson, supra note 14 (conspiracy).
26 See Note (1930) 30 COL. L. REV. 74.
27 The words "felony" and "misdemeanor" are defined merely by the
penalty involved. See A Uniform Classification of Major Offenses (June,
1928) REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON UNIFORM CRIME RECOIS, INTERNA-
TIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CHIEFS OF POLICE.
28 Cf. Coates v. United States, supra note 24 ($1000 and 1 year-ser-
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In so far as the formulation of this test represents an attempt
by the courts to preserve a discretionary power, it is a com-
mendable effort. The desirability of granting wide and un-
checked authority to justices of the peace, particularly where
they operate on the fee basis, may well be questioned2 For
this reason, any endeavor to crystallize the distinction between
serious and petty offenses on the sole basis of penalty, such as
is proposed by the proponents of the "public tort" classification,39
is not entirely free from objection. But the moral nature test
is open to the same criticism, for instead of providing a means
of lifting a particular case out of the petty offense category
on the strength of its peculiar facts, it merely places the offense
in a different category, to be kept there permanently by the force
of precedent. 1 Its inherent possibilities of abuse have been re-
vealed in the Colts case, the first decision which could not also
have been justified on the ground either of the size of the penalty
or of historical precedent. The vice of the test is that the con-
stitutional right to a jury trial is made to depend upon the moral
sense of the specific court, without limitation by legislative judg-
ment expressed in the form of penalty or by historical classifica-
tion of the offense. And in the wide range of federal jurisdic-
tion, it is inconceivable that differences in environment and
training should not produce coterminously varying concepts
of morality. Petty larcency,32 gambling:13 and driving while in-
toxicated 3--to name but a few--have consistently been held
petty offenses, to be tried summarily. Yet if the test of morality
were to be the sole arbiter, it might prove difficult to justify
distinguishing from these the offense of reckless driving.
The merits of trial by jury are necessarily beyond the scope
of this comment. Critics of the practical operation of the system
have indicated such objections as the deficiency in mental cali-
bre of the average jury, prejudice created by wide newspaper
publicity in certain types of crime, and the cost and delay of
ous); United States v. Praeger, 149 Fed. 474 (W. D. Tex. 1907) ($500
and 6 months-petty). The English figure for maximum punishment of a
petty offense is £100 and 6 months. See STONE, JusTicEs' MANUAL (Gist
ed. 1929) 1764 et seq.
29 See Willis, Are Justices of the Peace Courts Impartial? (1928) 3 ID.
L. J. 654.
30 See Note (1922) 35 HAne. L. Rfv. 462.
31 There is also the persuasive influence exerted on other jurisdictions,
where perhaps a totally different situation may exist. A very recent New
York case has followed the ruling in the Colts case on a charge of recless
driving. Matter of Application of People ex rel Cooley, 139 Misc. 321,
248 N. Y. Supp. 328 (Sup. Ct. 1931).
32 Lewis v. Robbins, 95 lass. 552 (1866).
33 State v. Capell, 154 La. 662, 98 So. 58 (1923).
34 Latimer v. Wilson, 103 N. J. L. 159, 134 Atl. 750 (1926).
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jury trials.35 On the other hand, there is the invaluable safe-
guard provided the accused against the arbitrary judicial dis-
position26 But one limit of any system of justice is the extent
to which it may be made effective, and thus the question of
expedience, at the outset but one of many factors to be taken
into consideration as a basis of appraisal, becomes at a later
point a decisive factor in itself. Statistics are at best uncertain
guides, but they are perhaps sufficient to indicate the importance
of the petty offense category to criminal administration. In
New Haven, where state laws allowing waiver 37 would minim.
ize the administrative difficulties arising from limitation of this
category, over five thousand offenses were investigated in the
police court in 1927, of which number all but some two hundred
were finally disposed of in that court. In the Superior and
Common Pleas courts of New Haven County, less than six hun-
dred criminal cases were considered in that year, and of these
under thirty, or approximately 5%, were tried to the jury. If
but the same percentage of motor-law violators, for example,
were to demand and be granted a jury trial, the number of such
trials would exceed four hundred. While the notorious conges-
tion of jury dockets is, at least in waiver states, largely mythi-
cal,38 nevertheless the large discrepancy between the present an-
nual number of criminal jury trials in a single city, and a con-
servative estimate of the increase that would result from the
removal of but one group of crimes from the petty to the serious
offense category suggests that such a transfer would result
either in inevitable overcrowding of the jury calendar, with its
attendant evils of delay, expense and bargaining by the prosecu-
tor,39 or as an alternative, a practical nullification of the prohibi-
tion against the offense."
The decision in the Colts case serves a valuable purpose in
focussing attention upon the importance of the petty offense
category. The historical classification was based to a consider-
able extent upon contemporary expedience though phrased in
35 See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND (Cleveland Foundation 1922) 341
et seq; The MISSOURI CRIME SURVEY (1926) 178 et seq. TIE ILLINOIS CRIME
SURVEY (1929) 230 et seq.
36 See 1 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW (3rd ed. 1922) 320;
FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT (1930) 60.
37 CONN. PUBLIC ACTS (1927) c. 267 § 2.
38 See Goldberg, op. cit. supra note 9, at 166.
39 See Miller, The Compromise of Criminal Cases (1927) 1 So. CALIF.
L. REv. 1.
40 In the two years prior to February 1930 when the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals handed down its decision in the Colts case, affirmed by
the Supreme Court in the instant decision, 3080 cases of reckless driving
had been filed in the Police Court. Since that time, only some 900 cases




terms of the inherent moment of the particular offense41 Mlod-
ern development in the classification of statutory offenses should
take place by the adjustment of penalties according to what
may be a changing criterion of expedience and rather than by
ignoring past experience, and substituting in its stead individual
opinions of morality. The moral sense of the community will
be more adequately reflected in the general adaptation of a classi-
fication than in sporadic and isolated personal judgments on
particular crimes.
THE ELEVATED RAILWAY CONDEMNATION CASE-
ANOTHER A"N.AYSIS OF THE PROPERTY INTERESTS
LTVOLVED
IN two previous Comments.in this volume,' there have been dis-
cussions of a recent New York case involving rights to compen-
sation on the dismantling of a part of the elevated railway sys-
tem in New York City. When this system was built, the courts
held that the railway company must make compensation to
abutting owners for interference with light, air, and access. Now,
upon dismantling the elevated structure, that interference
ceases; and the railway company claims a right to compensation
for the retaking of the easements of light, air, and access, re-
transferred, so it contends, to the abutting owners. The trial
court sustained the claim and made an allowance of $750,000.2
The Appellate Division also sustained the claim, but allowed
only $200,000..
The writers of both the previous Comments criticize these
decisions, being in disagreement, however, as to the character
of the property interests and the amount to be allowed as com-
pensation. Both make valuable contributions to an understand-
ing of the problem. With many of the matters there discussed,
the present Comment does not deal; but an additional and some-
what different analysis of the property interests that are in-
volved will be attempted. If this analysis is sound, the railway
company has no right to compensation for anything that is
retransferred to the abutting owners.
Unquestionably the railway company has property that is now
being taken for the public benefit. The question is to determine
41 See PALEY, SUMMARY CONVICTIONS (9th Ed. 1926) 5; Frankfurter and
Corcoran, op. cit. supra note 15, at 926.
140 YALE L. J. 779, 1074.
2 In re Forty-Second St. Spur of Manhat. Ry. Co., 126 Mise. 879, 216
N. Y. Supp. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1926).
' In re Elevated Railroad Structures, 229 App. Div. 617, 2 M N. Y. Supp.
665 (1st Dep't 1930).
13091931]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
just what is this property for which compensation is to be made.
The theory of the railway company and of the court seems to
be that, when the railway was first built, the railway company
acquired certain easements of light, air, and access from the
abutting owners, paying the assessed value thereof; that these
easements are now being taken from the railway company and
retransferred to the abutting owners; and that the railway com-
pany is entitled to compensation at their present reasonable
valuation.
What are these easements of light, air, and access that were
originally "taken" from the abutting owners? No concept in
our law, as used in specific cases is in greater need of exact and
detailed analysis than the concept of "property." Without such
analysis, the policies that are involved and the requirements of
the public welfare cannot be determined. Analysis does not
determine what sound policy requires, but it is a necessary pre-
requisite to its determination. This is shown by the struggles
and differences of the courts and commentators in the present
case. Easements are only one sort of property; and they must
yield to analysis.
Prior to the building of the elevated railway, the owners of
the abutting lots had easements of light, air, and access. This
means only that those owners had rights against all other persons
(rights in rem) that they should not interfere unreasonably
with the passage of light and air to the lots in question or with
the opportunity of convenient access and approach. An "ease-
ment" is not a physical res; like all other property, it consists
of human relations recognized by the courts. In the present in-
stance, the easements of the abutting owners were manifold
rights against innumerable people, putting upon those people
the correlative duties of forbearance and correspondingly limit-
ing their legal privileges-their freedom of action.
It seems to be the established law that these easements of
light, air, and access-these manifold rights against others-
are appurtenant to particular parcels of land. They are for the
protection of the use and enjoyment of that land and of no
other land whatever; they cannot be sold or transferred apart
from that land; they cannot be held "in gross." Therefore, it
appears that by the original condemnation proceedings, the rail-
way company did not acquire and could not acquire these ease-
ments. This is because they did not acquire the particular lots
for the sole benefit of which the easements existed.
4
4 The trial court recognized that these latter easements "cannot be owned
separate and distinct from the ownership of the land to which they are
appurtenant"; but it failed to recognize that herein lay the key to the
problem of the railway company's right to compensation. Instead, it




By the condemnation process, however, the railway company
did acquire, as against each abutting owner, the privilege of
interfering with his light, air, and access, so far as the main-
tenance of the railway required; and as against the railway
company, the abutting owner lost his right against such inter-
ference. Not only was this not a transfer of the easements to
the railway company, it was not even their entire destruction.
The lot owners still had their easements of light, air, and access,
as against everybody except the railway company; and it was the
continued existence of those easements that gave to the lots the
greatest part of their continuing market value. Who would pay
much for a lot if there. is danger that all of the light and air will
be shut off and all access, even that of the borrowing mole, will
be denied? The easements of the lot owners remained their prop-
erty exactly as before the condemnation, except that one im-
portant constituent element-namely, the right that the railway
company should not interfere unnecessarily with light, air, and
access-was extinguished.
There never was any "transfer" of property from the abutting
owners to the elevated railway company when the railway was
built; nor is there now any such "transfer" of property from the
elevated railway company to the abutting owners when the rail-
way is being dismantled. When the railway was built, the rail-
way company acquired much new property and the abutters lost
some of their property; but the property acquired was not that
which was lost. The State was creating and the State was
taking away. In the railway company it created a "franchise,"
including privileges of using the streets and of carrying for hire,
and rights in rem against all persons that they should not inter-
fere with the exercise of these privileges. From the abutting
owners, it took away their previously existing rights against
certain types of interference by the railway company with light,
,air, and access. The abutters never had the property (called
the "franchise") or any part thereof, created by the State in the
railway company; the railway company never acquired the prop-
erty (called the "easements of light, air, and access"), one part
of which was taken by the State from the abutters.
In the case of a "transfer" of property, the transferee is sub-
stituted for the transferor. The latter's rights, privileges,
powers, and immunities in rcm pass to the transferee. So also
do some of the transferor's duties and liabilities-for example,
the duty of keeping the premises in safe condition and the liabil-
ity to taxation; the analysis of ownership (or property) shows
that it is not in all respects advantageous to the owner. In the
case of such a simple piece of property as a chose in action--
for example, a contract right-its transfer by assignment ex-
tinguishes the right of the assignor against the debtor and
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creates a similar right in the assignee against the debtor. In
the case of the more complex property in a chattel or in land,
its transfer extinguishes the transferor's privileges of user, his
rights against interference by others, his powers of conveyance,
his duties of keeping in safe condition, his liability to taxation,
and the other constituent relations of which property is com-
posed; and it creates exactly similar ones in the transferee.
When the railway was built, there was no such transfer as
this; there was a taking by eminent domain from the abutting
owners, destroying their previous right against interfence-by
the railway company. There was a creation of valuable prop-
erty in the railway company, justifying an assessment for the
benefits conferred by the community. But the value of the prop-
erty of the abutters taken and extinguished by the community
was not the same as the value of the property newly created
in the railway company by the community. The requirement
that the railway company should pay the abutting owners for
the destroyed part of their easements was merely a part of the
method of assessing the railway company for the benefits that
it received from the State; it was not a payment of the price of
property transferred by the abutting owners to the railway com-
pany.
Now the public is again "taking" property, in the sense of
destroying it, except that this time it is destroying the property
of the railway company instead of the abutters. Again, new prop-
erty is being created in the abutters (it is the formerly de-
stroyed portion of the easement),5 although there is no "trans-
fer" from the railway company. In so far as the abutters are
now the special beneficiaries of the destruction of the railway
company's property, it is just to assess the benefits against them
(just as we do the benefits from paving an adjacent street); and
to use such assessment in compensating the railway company
for its loss. This is exactly what was done originally when the
railway was built.
It never was just to assess the railway company more than it
was benefited, or to pay to the abutters more than they were
injured. In fact, the railway company received property that
may have been worth much more than the amount of the injury
to the abutters. If the railway company is required to pay the
It is probably safe to assume, as the trial court did, that upon dis-
mantling the railway the privilege of the company to occupy the streot
is totally destroyed, and the right of the abutting owners that the company
shall not interfere with light, air, and access is recreated. If this is true,
the abutting owners' easements of light, air, and access are restored to
their original perfection by the recreation of the one constituent right that
had been destroyed. If this is not true, there is much less benefit to tho
abutting owners and much less reason for assessing them for benefits
conferred.
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full value of what it got, the amount by wlich it exceeds the
injury to the abutters should go to the community that created
that property, not to the abutters who transferred none of it.
So now, it is not just to assess the abutters more than they are
benefited by the new creation of property in them, or to pay
to the railway company more than it is injured by the destruc-
tion of its property. If the abutters are required to pay the
full value of what they get, the amount, so far as it exceeds the
railway company's injury, should go to the community that again
creates the property, not to the railway company that transfers
none of it.
Originally, it was proper to require the railway company to
pay for the injury suffered by the abutters, because the injury
was a necessary result of giving the railway company the rights
and privileges that it asked (that is, its newly created property) ;
also for the reason that the community had to pay for the injury
to the abutters and it might well be distributed on the large
numbers of users of the railway company who were especially
benefited by the sacrifice.
Now, it may be proper to require the abutters to pay for the
injury suffered by the railway company, but not for the same
reasons. The abutters may or may not be "asking" for the dis-
mantling of the railway; in either case they do not obtain, as
did the railway company, new and effective means of distributing
the cost upon the community or the benefited members thereof.
The community is destroying the property of the railway com-
pany and the community should pay the full amount of the in-
jury. To raise the money necessary for this, it is customary
and reasonable for the community to assess those who are special
beneficiaries of the process. Among these are unquestionably
the abutters. They may properly be assessed by the community
to the extent that their benefits are in excess of the benefits
acquired by other members of the community. Part or all of
this assessment may be appropriated in payment of what the
community owes to the railway company; but the amount of that
debt is determined solely by the value of the railway company's
property that is destroyed and has no relation whatever to the
value of the special benefit conferred upon the abutting owners.
How much the State should charge against the abutting owners
for their special benefit and what part thereof should go to the
railway company is for the State to determine, not for the rail-
way company to demand. As against the abutting owners them-
selves, the railway company has no claim whatevere
6 This Comment deals only with easements ex.tinguished and with rights
and privileges gained by the process of condemnation for public purposes.
No doubt, the railway company could have obtained a greater property
interest by private purchase and conveyance. Thus, it might buy an
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The depreciation in value of the railway company's franchise,
or of the privilege of interference with light, air, and access that
formed a constituent part of its total property, is a matter for
consideration in the condemnation proceeding. So also is the ap-
preciation in value of the abutting owner's right against inter-
ference that is being restored to him, in the process of assessing
his benefits. It is obvious that the value of the privilege may
have depreciated while the value of the right has appreciated.
The value of the privilege depends on the operation of the trains;
the value of the right depends on the uses of the land. If the
company's franchise, including the privilege of interference, had
appreciated in value, while the land values of the abutting
owners, including their easements, had depreciated, the city
might have had to pay a large amount to the railway company,
while collecting only a small assessment from the abutting
owners. If in such case the city must bear the loss, in the
converse case the city should reap the profit.
In cases of a taking by eminent domain, Mr. Justice Holmes
says that the question is, "What has the owner lost, not, What
has the taker gained ?"T This is clearly demonstrated to be cor-
rect when it appears that what the owner loses is different both
in kind and in value from that which the taker gains. When the
State or one of its agencies destroys property for a public pur-
pose, there may be circumstances under which no compensation
at all will be made under our existing law; but in the cases
where compensation is due, it is measured by the value of the
property destroyed, not by the amount by which somebody else
may profit from the destruction.
On the other hand, in cases where the State is assessing a
property owner for special benefits conferred upon him, the state-
ment of Mr. Justice Holmes does not apply. The question now
is, What has the recipient gained, not, What has somebody else
lost?
In many eminent domain proceedings, no doubt the two prob-
lems exist together and both questions ought to be answered.
Very likely, confusion exists for failure to differentiate them, the
abutting lot outright, with its appurtenant easements of light, air, and
access. On any subsequent condemnation of this abutting lot by the city,
the value of the easements, as well as of the lot without them, would have
to be paid. With some of the abutting owners, the railway company had
dealt privately and had obtained from them voluntary deeds of conveyance.
It is believed, however, that these deeds of conveyance by the abutting
owners, not involving the physical land itself, should generally be con-
Ftrued as conveying and creating only that interest that was required
for railway purposes. This would be identical with the interest that would
be created by the condemnation proceedings.
7 See Boston Chamber of Commerce v. Boston, 217 U. S. 189, 195, 30 Sup.
Ct. 459, 460 (1910); of. Comment (1931) 40 YAi L. J., at 783.
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supposition being that the two questions are identical and that
the loss of one party is the other's gain. In the case of dis-
mantling the elevated railway, the two questions are not identi-
cal and the railway company's loss is not at all the same as the
abutting owners' gain.
The result reached by this analysis is that although the rail-
way company is entitled to compensation by the city for all of
its property that is taken from it by the city, whether taken
for destruction or for enjoyment by a transferee, this does not
include any easements of light, air, and access to the lots of
abutting owners. No part of any such easements ever formed
any part of the railway company's property. It includes the
property in the elevated structure as a physical rcs, including
easements of light, air, and access to this elevated structure. It
includes the "franchise" (a term as greatly in need of analysis
as is the term easement, for it, too, is not a physical res, but
consists of legal relations between men) ; forming a part of this
are the legal privileges (ini rem) of erection, maintenance, and
user. One of these privileges is the privilege as against each
abutting owner-a privilege that was obtained by condemnation
process, and costing (with respect to all the abutting owners)
some $200,000. Without these privileges the "franchise" would
have been incomplete and ineffective; and there is no good rea-
son for separating them from the other privileges and rights
of which the franchise is composed.
After the court has valued the elevated structure and the
franchise, there is no other property left to be valued. To value
anything further is to give double compensation for the same
thing or to give compensation for something that the company
never owned.3
If the city so desires, no doubt it is possible to make abutting
owners parties to the condemnation proceeding and to assess
them for the benefits that they will derive from the new public
improvement. This is a problem of assessment for benefits, not
a problem of compensation for property taken for a public pur-
pose.
A.L. C.
s The analysis here made is not identical in form with that made by the
City of New York in the existing litigation; but it reaches the same result,
so far as concerns the right of the railway company to compensation for
the taking of its property. As against the railway company, the city
did not need to deal with its power to assess the abutting owners for
benefits received from the recreation of their former right.
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